Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

truth is independent of human beliefs and the influence of science on human affairs issomewhat paradoxical 93 .Luttwak employed this notion to good use when he observed that, precisely becausea strategy worked once, it will likely be emulated or at least learned from, and subsequentlystrategist must devise new constructs and hypothesis that provide a plausible expectation forsuccess 94 . Strategic theories arise after clashes of old views, in a somewhat Darwinian, orperhaps Kuhnian fashion; when promising ideas and propositions have been tried in battle,they elicit counter ideas negating the validity of formerly successful propositions. In similarfashion, the deterministic theory of nuclear strategy in the 20 th Century, for instance, hasgiven rise to strategic theories that uncover and emphasize the dynamic nature and processesof and in war, which in fact comes down to a rediscovery of the valuable work of vonClausewitz (and Boyd’s work must be considered a similar response as well, as will be shownin the next chapter).But even the general theory developed by Clausewitz generates its counter. Someauthors point out that for some peoples and cultures war may have different purposes(symbolic, ritual or existential in stead of instrumental) and follow different rules, and maynot be so linked and constrained by politics 95 . In other words, Clausewitz’ work may beextremely important because of its intrinsic value and because it has shaped thinking aboutthe nature of war and strategy, but it may also be constraining understanding preciselybecause it has become a paradigm, closing the eyes for the existence of other paradigms. Infact, one may argue that the current Western mode of thinking and waging war, which isfounded on Clausewitzian principles, is giving rise to non-Clausewitzian styles of warfare,with obvious consequences for the state of strategic theory.Kalevi Holsti, for instance points at the fundamentally different political processes ina large number of wars of the “Third Kind”: ‘most fundamentally, the assumption that theproblem of war is primarily a problem of the relations between states has to be seriouslyquestioned’, because ‘security between states in the Third World has become increasinglydependent upon security within those states. The problem of contemporary and futureinternational politics is essentially a problem of domestic politics. The source of the problemis found in the nature of new states’ 96 . Also the reasons for fighting cannot be understoodwithin the nation-state framework: ‘more fundamental is the clash over different conceptionsof community and how these conceptions should be reflected in political arrangements andorganizations 97 .What Holsti labeled “Wars of the Third Kind” Mary Kaldor considers “NewWars” 98 . She agrees with Holsti that “identity politics” is central: ‘the exclusive claim topower on the basis of tribe, nation, clan or religious community. These identities are93 Wright, pp.116-188. As will be discussed later, this notion was labelled “reflexive” by AnthonyGiddens.94 Luttwak, Strategy, the Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma, 1987).95 This is the contested but nevertheless pertinent argument that Keegan, van Creveld and someothers make. See for a concise discussion and refutation Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and theGrand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz’, War and History, Volume 1, No.3 (November 1994). For arecent study in military cultures which highlights the alternatives to the Western instrumentalist viewof war, see for instance Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors, The Changing Culture of MilitaryConflict, (IISS, London, 2002).96 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996),pp.14, 15.97 Holsti, p.18.98 Kaldor, M., New & Old Wars, Organized violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge, 1999).28