13.07.2015 Views

Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Magnify adversary’s friction <strong>and</strong> stretch-out his time (for a favorable mismatch infriction <strong>and</strong> time), thereby:Deny adversary the opportunity to cope with events/efforts as they unfold.Circling back to the beginning, to the set <strong>of</strong> criteria Boyd had stipulated for a ‘first ratecomm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system’, Boyd concludes that it is implicit orientation which shapesthe character <strong>of</strong> insight <strong>and</strong> vision, focus <strong>and</strong> direction, adaptability, <strong>and</strong> security. <strong>The</strong>refore,a comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system, any design or related operational methods should play to<strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>, not play down <strong>and</strong> diminish, implicit orientation 23 . As he states, ‘up to this pointwe have shown orientation as being a critical element in comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control - implyingthat without orientation there is no comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control worthy <strong>of</strong> the name. Very nice,but simply stated, what does this comment <strong>and</strong> everything else we’ve discussed so far tell usabout comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control?’ 24 Boyd takes his audience by the h<strong>and</strong> by <strong>of</strong>fering thefollowing important illumination 25 :<strong>The</strong> process <strong>of</strong> observation-orientation-decision-action represents what takes placeduring the comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control process - which means that the OODA loop can bethought <strong>of</strong> as being the C&C loop.<strong>The</strong> second O, orientation - as the repository <strong>of</strong> our genetic heritage, cultural tradition,<strong>and</strong> previous experiences - is the most important part <strong>of</strong> the OODA loop since itshapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act.ImplicationOperating inside adversary’s OODA loop means the same things as operating insideadversary’s C&C loop.Redefining comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> controlThus far one could argue that Boyd has addressed the organic part <strong>of</strong> the title <strong>of</strong> thepresentation. He has developed several ideas about the comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control process bytaking a systems view, or rather a complex adaptive systems view. Although clear <strong>and</strong>persuasive, these ideas are still rather conceptual <strong>and</strong> general. So Boyd now makes his waytoward the practical side <strong>of</strong> effective comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control, which will lead him to aredefinition <strong>of</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control <strong>and</strong> a focus on the essence <strong>of</strong> leadership.His starting point, <strong>and</strong> the normative framework, is clearly the previous discussionon the criteria for a first rate comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system. Indeed, his views on effectivecomm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control aim to effectuate such a system. And again, he seeks inspiration, if notsubstantiation, in some historical snapshots he had already used in Patterns <strong>of</strong> Conflict. Herefers among others to Napoleon’s use <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>of</strong>ficers for personal reconnaissance, vonMoltke’s message directives <strong>of</strong> few words, the contrasting British approach <strong>of</strong> tight controlduring the Battle <strong>of</strong> the Somme in 1916 26 . But he leans in particular, <strong>and</strong> explicitly, on Martinvan Creveld’s study Comm<strong>and</strong> in <strong>War</strong> to gain a “richer view”. Boyd includes an entire pagefrom van Creveld’s book that deals with the Israeli comm<strong>and</strong> set up during the June 196723 Ibid, p.24.24 Ibid, p.25.25 Ibid, p.2626 Ibid, p.28.240

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!