Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

while the present OODA loops shape the character of future orientation. It feeds forwardand backward. Orientation is the key phase in the OODA loop. Brave decisions and heroicactions are pointless if the observation was inaccurate because of our inadequate orientation.Orientation is made up of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, experience, and unfoldingcircumstances. Orientation is shaped by the interplay of these factors. It is the “genetic code”of an organism or organization. For any command concept, then, orientation is the“Schwerpunkt”.Second, in order to avoid predictability and ensuring adaptability to a variety ofchallenges, just having one common orientation, one thought pattern, one belief systems orone military doctrine to solve all operational contingencies will not suffice. It is essential tohave a repertoire of orientation patterns and the ability to select the correct one according tothe situation at hand while denying the opponent the latter capability. In order to maintainvariety in response one should have variety built into the making of orientation patterns. Theway to do this is to involve people with varying backgrounds and experience and confrontthem as a group with varying situations. This will built trust and variety in response andcommunication about each other’s way of looking at situations. Boyd is very much awarethat one needs to take care when selecting people in command but also in operationalheadquarters. This concept in turn requires a common outlook and doctrine, otherwise unitsmay respond in totally unexpected ways.At the same time one wants to keep the opponent in the dark or bewildered. Thiswill make it hard for him to read the strategic environment correctly thus making anyselection of orientation pattern and subsequent set of responses guesswork. Here again theidea we saw earlier of creating many non-cooperative centers makes good sense. Without theability of proper communication, the isolated and/or disoriented units sent contradicting,incomplete, inconsistent, outdated or no information at all. This denies a commander thecapability to form a balanced judgment that is based on various looks at the same situation.Boyd calls this a situation in which a command and control system is turned inward. Such asituation will always lead to dissolution and disintegration (the system becomes unglued).The third aspect Boyd argues for in relation to orientation is the insistence to have arepertoire of relevant schemata combined with a capability to validate the schemata before andduring operations and the capability to devise and incorporate new ones, if one is to survivein a rapidly changing environment. Indeed, learning is essential for adaptation. One mayreact very fast to unfolding events, but if one is constantly surprised nevertheless, apparentlyone has not been able to turn the findings of repeated observations and actions into a betterappreciation of the opponent, i.e., one has not learned but instead continued to operate onexisting orientation patterns. Verifying existing beliefs and expectations, and if necessarymodifying these in a timely manner, is crucial. The way to play the game of interaction andisolation is to spontaneously generate new mental images that match-up with an unfoldingworld of uncertainy and change, Boyd asserted in The Strategic Game. So, indeed, a majortheme throughout, for all levels of organization and war is the capability to evolve, to adapt,to learn, or what one author recently labeled as ‘organizational learning dominance’ 114 .Boyd’s advice for organizational culture and structure are entirely consistent with hisemphasis on adaptability. Boyd stresses that setting up and maintaining connections are vital.External explicit connections are however prone to interruption, and when the commandsystem is based on them, it will generally be slower than a concept which is based onimplicit communication. The latter can make do with less information, less external114 R. Evan Ellis, ‘Organizational Learning Dominance, The Emerging Key to Success in the New Eraof Warfare’, Comparative Strategy, 18:191-202, 1999.277