Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Shift from such an ambiguous or misleading posture into a gauntlet defense with alternativechannels, sectors, or zones by thinning-out some sectors or zones in order to strengthenothers.The basic notion is to think in terms of channels, avenues, and gauntlets (instead of justbelts, bands and fronts) so that ambush gauntlets will naturally evolve or be set-up to dealwith forward as well as lateral (roll-out) thrusts of the adversary. In this way, ambushgauntlets can then be set-up at any level from platoon to theater 132 .At the tactical level one should use obstacles, delaying actions, hit-and-run attacks(note the inclusion of guerrilla tactics) and/or baited retreats in thinned-out sectors/zonestogether with “shaping” and “disruption” activities to disorient adversary as well as to pileupor stretch-out his maneuver. These actions should be accompanied with fire andmovement (coming from one’s own strengthened adjacent sectors/zones) into the flanksand/or rear of the adversary. This will slow the opponent’s momentum and ‘blow adversaryaway’, or alternatively, will channel the momentum. The thrust can then either bedecapitated, or in case of stretch-out, the cohesion of the thrust can be broken 133 .The cognitive effects of these actions are what matters, and these cognitive effectswill lead to an enemy response which is to some extend predictable. Thus shaping theenemy’s actions can be effectuated. As Boyd explains:Mental pictureThink of obstacles, delay, hit-and-run, and baited retreats together with shaping anddisruption activities as Cheng or Nebenpunkte to create gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerablerears by the pile-up/congestion or stretch-out of adversary maneuver.Think of Ch’i or Schwerpunkt maneuver (fire and movement) hitting unexpectedly thru gapsinto adversary flank/rear, or blind-side, as a decisive stroke to pull enemy apart and roll-uphis isolated remnants 134 .A similar message lies in other related air and ground reconnaissance and offensive actions.They serve to harass and delay the enemy, to disorient him while at the same time providinginformation to one’s own senior commanders to help them decide which sectors to thin-outand which to strengthen 135 . Multiple counterstrokes, the interplay of Nebenpunkte andSchwerpunkte disrupt the enemy offensive, force him to allow gaps and to stretch out hisforces. Rapid shifts of forces can then reinforce a successful minor counter attack into a‘super-Schwerpunkt’. Such maneuvers are effective not only because of the delay in theadvance they cause but also by forcing the opponent to become ‘preoccupied in overcomingthe challenge posed by the Super Nebenpunkte’. Such Counter-Blitz actions keep thepressure on the enemy who now is continually forced to adapt to many abrupt and irregularchanges 136 .132 Ibid, p.150.133 Ibid, p.151. Anyone asserting that Boyd claims one can win by merely OODA looping faster hasoverlooked these deliberately chosen words.134 Ibid.135 Ibid, p.152.136 Ibid, pp.152-153.227