Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

shaping his work lies in his views on the Vietnam experience and the challenges facing theUS military in the aftermath of that war, the time during which Boyd developed his work;and his audience to which he lectured.As is the case with many strategists, Boyd studied military history and strategictheories and the influence of specific theories and insights permeate and color his work too.Chapter 3 therefore includes a discussion of a number of strategic theorists who haveexerted an obvious influence on Boyd through his study of strategic theory, such as Sun Tzu,Julian Corbet, T.H Lawrence, J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart. This will introduce ideaswhich found their place in Boyd’s work, thus easing the path for understanding the slides inA Discourse. It will also facilitate positioning Boyd in the history of strategic theory as well asprovide insights concerning the extent of his contribution to strategic theory.A less obvious but very interesting and equally influential formative factor is formedby his avid study of a variety of scientific fields, which offered him conceptual lenses throughwhich he interpreted, explained and substantiated his ideas. It suggested a number ofessential insights concerning the way science progresses, the way humans learn and thenature of knowing. Azar Gat has convincingly demonstrated that strategic thinkers of therecent centuries fit into the intellectual framework of their time period and how, in turn,strategic thought has developed as the intellectual environment has evolved 37 . This alsoapplies to Boyd. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on this aspect of Boyd’s work. They show thescientific Zeitgeist (here used as shorthand for the intellectual environment in a particularperiod) during which Boyd formulated his theory, as well as the way and the extent to whichit influenced his work. I argue that Boyd’s work is rooted in this scientific Zeitgeist and cannotbe properly understood without a level of familiarity with the debates and developments thattook place in the period Boyd developed his theory.Against this background, equipped with certain “conceptual lenses”, chapters 6 and7 offer a comprehensive view on the entire set of presentations Boyd left behind. Itcomprises of a very close rendering of the slides of Boyd’s presentations and his essay. Thisdescription allows the reader to follow Boyd through his own essay and the fourpresentations of A Discourse as well as through the two additional presentations. Thissomewhat elaborate examination of the essay and each individual briefing will give animpression of Boyd’s way of reasoning and of his ideas on how one should contemplateabout military strategy. It will show how Boyd built up his argument and what is behind thepopular OODA loop notion. It furthermore substantiate the conclusion laid out in Chapter8 that Boyd’s work contains many more arguments and insights concerning successfulstrategic behavior. Based in particular upon the themes, debates and insights from thescientific Zeitgeist that color Boyd’s work, and upon the pervasive presence of his ideas inmilitary studies and doctrinal debates in what many analysts have described as the postmodern period of the 1980s and 1990s, I conclude also that Boyd may be considered thefirst post-modern strategist, in particular considering the conceptual similarities betweenBoyd and several post modern social theorists, an argument which furthermore underlinesthe importance of an awareness of the Zeitgeist for understanding strategic theory.But first a brief introduction to strategic theory. Developing a comprehensivestrategic theory is a very difficult and daunting endeavour, and any study attempting todescribe, interpret and appreciate a theory should do so based on an appreciation of thepeculiarities of strategic theory.37 See C. Dale Walton, ‘The Strategist in Context: Culture, the Development of Strategic Thought, andthe Pursuit of Timeless Truth’, Comparative Strategy, 23, 2004, for a short assessment of Azar Gat’swork.12