Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

arguments Boyd developed. It is no coincidence Boyd harped on the intangibles of war, onthe fundamental uncertainty of war and strategy and on the alternatives to the attritional styleof warfare. On the other hand, considering the dominant strategic and military culture, it isall the more remarkable and equally impressive that someone was able first of all to developa new, distinctive and coherent military theory in such an environment, and second, to gainthe wide influence Boyd achieved with his non-conformist ideas.Second, contact with the audience provided direct feedback. Coram tells how Boydfound it difficult to finish an intellectual product. As soon as it was finished, he would insiston beginning on changes. These changes made him see another fallacy or another place forelaboration, and the process began all over 166 . As Hammond states, each version of ADiscourse was different, imperfect. Boyd refined and polished his ideas in response todiscussions and his expanding list of literature he devoured 167 . This was an essential element.If Hammond is correct when he notes of Patterns of Conflict that this massive set of slidesbecame ‘the means by which the philosophy of the [reform] movement was spread’, it is alsocorrect to note that the reform effort inspired his work and his insistence on maneuverwarfare as an alternative for the alleged flawed attritional war fighting style. He developed hisarguments and ideas with the purpose of inducing change. As Burton posits, Boyd’s mindsetwas infuzed with a measure of frustration concerning the sorry state of strategic thinking inthe US military establishment: ‘Boyd would change that and would force the military toscramble like mad to catch up with him as he produced theory after theory that was uniqueand revolutionary in the art of war’ 168 .A Discourse is thus the result and manifestation of Boyd’s own learning process, aprocess of analysis, synthesis, creation, destruction and recreation, or creative destruction.Like Clausewitz, Fuller and Liddell Hart in their times, Boyd’s ideas evolved and matured ina time when the US military was searching for novel ideas to solve concrete strategic andoperational problems. He was in no small measure a formative factor of the military Zeitgeistand the military Zeitgeist in turn was a formative factor of his ideas. It also suggests that animportant role of Boyd lay in rediscovering and synthesizing existing theories and insights andoffering them in a very digestible and convincing format to his audience. The chapter hasalso shed light on Boyd’s intellectual predecessors and inspirators, such as Fuller, LiddellHart and Sun Tzu. This discussion has also already hinted at Boyd’s other role; that of reconceptualizingmaneuver warfare and, by extension, other schools of strategic thought, withthe employment of the OODA loop model. And it is this last aspect that this study will turnnext.166 Coram, p.309.167 Hammond, p.17.168 Burton, p.44.77