Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Only the fourth condition relates to physical movements in space and time, but evenhere he includes the idea that these are tied to the enemy’s function of perception and hismorale: ‘Broad use of Schwerpunkt concept coupled with fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action ofarmored teams and air support permit Blitzers to repeatedly reshape strength and rapidlyshift it against, or through, weaknesses thereby generate doubt and uncertainty whichmagnify into panic and chaos’.These actions require (as a fifth condition) ‘superior mobile communications tomaintain cohesion of overall effort and to enable higher command levels to allocate reservesand support and to reshape as well as shift focus of main effort’. Again, the processes ofobservation and orientation take central place. The final condition is a small logistics tail(using airlift when appropriate and necessary) to support high-speed movement and rapidshift among routes of advance 87 . This section demonstrates that Boyd’s OODA loop ideaincludes more elements than the notion of outpacing the opponent’s decision cycle, as it isoften equated with.The Modern Guerrilla CampaignA similar dynamic. Boyd thus introduced infiltration tactics and Blitzkrieg warfare and hasadvanced the idea that in essence the dynamics are quite similar. They “work”, because ofsimilar dynamics at play. In his discussion of both he continuously emphasizes how actionswork upon the enemy’s processes of perception. He shows how the physical, the temporaland the mental dimensions interrelate, and that this connection actually provides therationale for the physical actions. Already he has briefly suggested that in the revolutionarywarfare concept developed in the interbellum such a dynamic could also be discerned. Hisnext topic, which aims to further bolster his argument, is an exploration of modern guerrillacampaigns. In it he also reaches back to his previous discussion of Lenin and Mao. Hefollows the by now familiar didactic structure. First he describes what in practical termsconstitutes a guerrilla campaigns, and the idea underlying it. From this he distills the essenceand abstract intent, implications and the keys for success for his discussion concerningpatterns of winning and losing.In a slide filled with dense prose he describes what actions guerrillas employ. Themain idea, the logic behind the guerrilla warfare approach, is toDefeat the existing regime politically by showing they have neither the moral right, nordemonstrated ability to govern and militarily by continuously using stealth/fasttempo/fluidity-of-actionand cohesion of small bands and larger units in cooperation withpolitical “agitprop” (agitation/propaganda) teams as basis to harass, confuse and ultimatelydestroy the will or capacity to resist 88 .According to Boyd, guerrillas capitalize on discontent and mistrust which is generated bycorruption (real of imagined), exploitation, oppression, incompetence, and the unwantedpresence of the existing regime. Thus they can evolve a common cause or a unifying themeas a basis to organize and maintain mass support through a militant political program. Theybuilt an administrative and military organization, create a sanctuary, and a communicationsnetwork under the control of the political leadership of the guerrilla movement. They takecare not to arouse the reigning regime’s intelligence and security apparatus. A shadowgovernment is created, with parallel hierarchies, in localities and regions that can be made rip87 Ibid, p.88.88 Ibid, p.90.204