Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.” 156 . This metaphorimplicitly confronts us with the chaos inherent in a nonlinear system sensitive to initialconditions. When a pendulum is released over three equidistant and equally powerfulmagnets, it moves irresolutely to and fro as it darts among the competing points ofattraction, sometimes kicking out high to acquire added momentum that allows it to keepgyrating in a startlingly long and intricate pattern.The probability is vanishingly small that an attempt to repeat the process wouldproduce exactly the same pattern. Even such a simple system is complex enough for thedetails of the trajectory of any actual “run” to be, effectively, irreproducible. Contrary toNewtonian assumptions in the pure theory of war, in the real world it is not possible tomeasure the relevant initial conditions (such as position) accurately enough to replicate themin order to get the same pattern a second time, because all physical measurements areapproximations limited by the instrument and standard of measurement. And what is neededis infinitely fine precision, for an immeasurably small change in the initial conditions canproduce a significantly different pattern. Nor is it possible to isolate the system from allpossible influences around it, and that environment will have changed since themeasurements were taken. Anticipation of the overall kind of pattern is possible, butquantitative predictability of the actual trajectory is lost.Clausewitz’s emphasis on unpredictability is another key manifestation of the rolethat nonlinearity plays in his work. Unpredictability is caused by “interaction, friction, andchance”. Clausewitz emphasized frequently that war is an interactive process and that thisinteractive nature is one of the causes that the outcome of action cannot be predicted:war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with themechanical arts, or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with thehuman mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at an animate objectthat reacts 157 .A military action produces not a single reaction, but dynamic interactions and anticipationsthat pose a fundamental problem for any theory. Such patterns can be theorized only inqualitative and general terms, not in the specific detail needed for prediction. Clausewitz thusunderstood an essential feature of nonlinearity and applied its consequences in hisunderstanding of war: the core cause of analytical unpredictability in war is the very nature of interactionitself, according to Beyerchen.The ubiquity of “friction”, - the ‘only concept that more or less corresponds to thefactors that distinguish real war from war on paper’ 158 – adds to the non-linear nature of war.The concept of friction is not just a statement that in war things always deviate from plan,but a sophisticated sense of why they do so. Friction as used by Clausewitz entails twodifferent but related notions that demonstrate the depth of his powers of observation andintuition. One meaning is the physical sense of resistance embodied in the word itself, whichin Clausewitz’s time was being related to heat in ways that would lead ultimately to theSecond Law of Thermodynamics and the concept of entropy. Friction is a nonlinearfeedback effect that leads to the heat dissipation of energy in a system. The dissipation is aform of increasing degradation toward randomness, the essence of entropy. Even inpeacetime, the degradation of performance in an army is a continual problem. In war, thedifficulties are amplified. Military friction is counteracted by training, discipline, inspections,156 Ibid, p.89.157 Ibid, p.149.158 Ibid, p.119.161