Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

predictability in an overall sense, crisis represent episodes of fundamental instability, ergounpredictability 147 . In 1994 Roger Beaumont published an interesting study on War, Chaosand History in which he highlighted the paradoxical and chaotic nature (as in chaos theory) ofwar, the collision of two most elemental human urges - one to produce chaos and the otherto impose order, and the nature of doctrines which he regards as schemata 148 .Boyd’s list of personal papers includes three papers on war and chaoplexity thatappeared in the early 1990s, besides the work by Barry Watts on non-linearity and strategythat appeared in the 1980s. In 1992 Steven Mann published a paper on chaos theory andstrategy 149 . Boyd read it. Mann lists four factors of the environment of a strategic entitywhich shape the criticality of a system of which it is part: (1) initial shape of the system, (2)underlying structure of the system, (3) cohesion among the actors, (4) conflict energy of theindividual actors. These factors, he states, should be examined before we can begin withcreating strategies. The initial shape, that is, the contours of a system at the beginninginfluence the system’s later development. Understanding the underlying structure means thephysical environment, the geo-strategic situation (for example the proximity of certainnations like Kuwait and Iraq) is a fundamental fact that shapes all subsequent policy in thatarea. Cohesion determines the rate at which reordering takes place. Ideologically andethnically homogeneous systems have different dynamics than multiethnic or ideologicallyvarious societies.On a military level, deterrence and arms control serve to increase cohesion amongstates. Increased cohesion does not prevent criticality; it only means that the progression tocriticality is slowed. Ineffective arrangements create false cohesion, several attempts to createa global order in this century come to mind. Finally each actor in politically critical systemspossesses conflict energy, an active force that instigates change in the status quo. This energydrives from motivations, values and capabilities of the specific actors, whether governments,political or religious movements or individuals. Effective treaties and compacts can slow theprogress of a system towards criticality, but, Mann states, we delude ourselves if we believeabsolute stability is attainable, all stability is transient in international affairs. Stability,presence, peace, etc. are contextless goals. Stability is no more than a consequence andshould never be a goal. Mann proposes to use criticality to one’s advantage by aiming toshape the broad context of security affairs. Policy should be directed at the broad context.Of the four mentioned factors only the latter two are somewhat within reach of policymakers and therefore policy efforts must center on achieving cohesion and mitigatingconflict energy. He concludes that we must develop an encompassing definition of strategy;not simply a match of means to ends but a match of paradigm to the particular strategicchallenge.In 1990 Alan Beyerchen produced a path-breaking study that appears also on Boyd’sreading list, and one that contains insights which could only convince Boyd of the soundnessof his own views in which fundamental uncertainty plays such a dominant role. TitledClausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War, he emphasizes the relevance of the new147 See Alvin Saperstein, ‘Chaos - A Model for the Outbreak of War’, Nature 309, pp.303-305. See also‘The Prediction of Unpredictability: Applications of the New Paradigm of Chaos in DynamicalSystems to the Old Problem of the Stability of a System of Hostile Nations’, in L. Douglas Kiel andEuel Elliott, pp.139-64.148 Roger Beaumont, War, Chaos, and History (Westport,1994).149 Steven Mann, ‘Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought’, Parameters, Vol. XXII, No.2. Autumn, 1992,pp.54-68.159