Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

alternative of the maneuver school of warfare. Several army officers noted Boyd’spresentations he gave at the Marines Corps, and the positive reaction of the Marines 139 .Subsequently, following the publication of FM 100-5, topics such as Blitzkrieg,Auftragstaktik, Schwerpunkt, and new leadership principles, the ideas of Sun Tzu, J.F.CFuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, the merits of maneuver warfare versus attrition type warfare,the concept of the operational level of war, the determinants of successful change in armies,Soviet Operational Art, and even Genghis Khan, frequently appeared in articles, all themespresent in Boyd’s work that evolved during that time 140 .Boyd’s influence was also explicit. The young captain’s explanation of Boyd’smessage at the time sheds light on the measure of Boyd’s influence as well as on the state ofdevelopment of Boyd’s thinking in 1979-1981. Coroalles explains that Boyd rediscovered thephilosophers and practitioners of maneuver warfare such as Alexander, Genghis Khan,Maurice de Saxe, de Bourcet, Guibert, J.F.C. Fuller and Heinz, Guderian. Next he offersBoyd’s ideas to lay out the alternative to the attrition method. As he states:Colonel Boyd observed that in any conflict all combatants go through repeated cycles of anobservation – orientation – decision –action (OODA) loop[…]The potentially victoriouscombatant is the one with the OODA loop which is consistently quicker than his opponent(including the time required to transition from one cycle to another). As this opponentrepeatedly cycles faster than his opponent, the opponent finds he is losing control of thesituation[…]his countermeasures are overcome by the rapidly unfolding events and becomeineffective in coping with each other. He finds himself increasingly unable to react. Suddenly,he realizes there is nothing else he can do to control the situation or turn it to his advantage.At this point he has lost. In essence his command circuits have been overloaded, therebymaking his decisions too slow for the developing situation […] all that remain areuncoordinated smaller units incapable of coordinated action. The enemy’s defeat in detail isthe eventual outcome 141 .This method would require continuous high tempo operations, a focus on creating andexposing flanks and rears, a concentration on weaknesses instead of enemy’s strengths.Firepower would be used primarily for disrupting the enemy and not solely for its attritioneffect. It would require furthermore mission tactics or Auftragstaktik for the party which canconsistently operate the longest without new orders will inevitably have the greater advantageover an opponent awaiting orders after every action. Such a command style requires mutualtrust and a reliance on small-unit initiative 142 .139 Ibid. Coroalles for instance refers to an article in The Marine Corps Gazette titled ‘winning throughmaneuver’ of December 1979 by captain Miller.140 See for instance, Colonel Wayne A. Downing, ‘Firepower, Attrition, Maneuver, US Army Doctrine:A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond’, Military Review, January 1981, pp. 64-73; Roger Beaumont,‘On the Wehrmacht Mystique’, Military Review, January 1981, pp. 44-56; Archer Jones, ‘FM 100-5: Aview from the Ivory Tower’, Military Review, May 1984, pp. 17-22; Major General John Woodmansee,‘Blitzkrieg and the AirlandBattle’, Military Review, August 1984, pp.21-39; Colonel Huba Wass deCzege, ‘How to Change an Army’, Military Review, November 1984, pp. 32-49; Captain Antulio J.Echevarria II, ‘Auftragstaktik: in its Proper Perspective’, Military Review, October 1986, pp. 50-56;Daniel Hughes, ‘Abuses of German Military History’, Military Review, December 1986, pp. 66-76;Major General Edward Atkeson, ‘The Operational Level of War’, Military Review, March 1987, pp. 28-36.141 Coroalles, pp. 37-38.142 Ibid, p.38.73