Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

commanders to improve their decision making and fight in ways that were not previouslypossible’. This will be achieved if the following is accomplished in three domains of armedforces 126 . In the “Physical domain”, ‘all elements of the force are robustly networked whichwill enable ‘achieving secure and seamless connectivity’. In the “Information domain” theforce must have the ‘capability to collect, share, access, and protect information’, as well as‘the capability to collaborate in the information domain, which enables a force to improve itsinformation position through processes of correlation, fusion, and analysis’. This will allow aforce to ‘achieve information advantage over an adversary in the information domain’. In the“Cognitive domain” the force must have ‘the capability to develop and share high qualitysituational awareness’ and the ‘capability to develop a shared knowledge of commander’sintent’. This will enable ‘the capability to self-synchronize its operations’.Summarizing the warfighting advantages, one article lists the following, and Boydiantenets clearly are manifest 127 : NCW could permit a geografically dispersed force to operate as a system –in effect, as a“dispersed mass”. Such a force, though its elements might be spread over a large area, shouldbe able to concentrate precision weapons rapidly upon targets hundreds of miles away. Its units may be able to mass fires not only with decisive effect but without the need tomaneuver – without having to get closer to targets, avoid geographical constraints, or achievesome positional advantage NCW offers the flexibility, operational reach, and battlespace awareness needed tooperate on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels at once. Combat would no longerhave to proceed in the traditional step-by-step, or serial, manner. Combat would instead bemultidimensionally and comprehensively joint. Such parallel warfare can produce the systemic disruption of the enemy’s operationalfunctions and lock out (preclude) options. NCW, by making a force capable of concentrating fires precisely where desired, may beable to influence enemy actions and perceptions of options in ways that once only forces onthe spot, and usually on the ground, could achieve. That is, the capabilities offered by aNCW force should produce operational advantages and second-order consequences thatonce required the tangible presence, and particular physical dispositions, of combat power.These advantages are embedded in the “tenets” of NCW: ‘a force with these attributes andcapabilities will be able to increase combat power by Better synchronizing effects in the battlespace Achieving greater speed of command Increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness 128 .Thus Steven Metz concludes that ‘the US military will be the first postmodern state combatant,attaining greatly amplified speed and precision by the integration information technology anddevelopment of a system of systems which link together methods for target acquisition,126 Ibid, pp.3-9 en 3-10.127 Paul Murdock, ‘Principles of War on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy ofForce’, Parameters, Spring 2002, pp.91-92.128 These “tenets” appear in several NCW publicatieons. See NCW Report to Congress, p.i, v, or 3-10.310