Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

a revolution in military affairs occurs when technological change makes possible material,which when combined with organizational and operational change, results in atransformation in the conduct of warfare 96 .Another equally influential and similar definition by Andrew Krepinevich posits that anRMA occurswhen the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systemscombines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations in a way thatfundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict 97 .The RMA is the product of a confluence of three streams of technological change combinedwith organizational changes. Surveillance capabilities improved. It became possible todetecting, observe and tracking things and people of military concern all weather and duringday and night time. This translated into improved ability to track potential or actual targetsno matter what their speed. Eliot Cohen described it as ‘anything that moves on thebattlefield can be seen and what can be seen can be hit’ 98 . The second technological streamconcerns advances in information processing and presentation. The rapid increase incomputing power and transmission capabilities of modern communication systems offeredthe opportunity to analyze, disseminate and access unprecedented quantities of informationin ever shortening time. Commanders and tactical operators gain direct access to sensorsdramatically improving their situational awareness. And this translated into the thirdtechnical stream; the ability to hit targets precisely and quickly. On the organizational anddoctrinal level, this implied an empowerment of small units and the ability of armed forces tocover larger distances quicker, to influence events over larger swaths of territory, and to domore things in a given period of time. Combat intensity would go up, risk would go down.Massing of forces would become a thing of the past. Instead, fires would be massed, comingfrom stand-off weapons launched from ships, aircraft or ground based rocket launchers.Finally, it would become harder for an opponent to find sanctuary anywhere. Indeed, thecumulative effects of the technological and organizational changes stimulated by theinformation revolution would be revolutionary.Thus Eliot Cohen claimed that ‘a revolution in military affairs in under way. It willrequire changes of a magnitude that people still do not completely grasp’ 99 . Others did graspit claiming the information revolution based RMA offered a transition from attrition warfaredevelopments, or its effects only very temporary. See for instance MacGregor Knox and WilliamsonMurray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, Cambridge, 2001; Colin Gray, Weapons for StrategicEffect, How Important is Technology? (Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, January2001); Collin McInnes, ‘Spectator Sport Warfare’, in Stuart Croft and Terry Terrif, Critical Reflecions onSecurity and Change (London, 2000). A very fresh approach is offered by Andrew Latham, ‘WarfareTransformed; A Braudelian Perspective on the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, European Journal ofInternational Relations, Vol. 8(2), pp. 231-266. He sees several technical, political and societaldevelopments of a revolutionary kind, but occurring in different time-scales. This allows him to putinto perspective the various schools of thought.96 Andrew Marshall, Testimony before the senate Armed Services Committee, subcommittee onAcquisition and Technology, 5 May 1995.97 Andrew Krepinevich, ‘From Cavalry to Computer’, The National Interest, no 37, Fall 1994, p.30.98 Eliot Cohen, ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, (1996), 75, 2, p.54.99 Ibid, p.37.304