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Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

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thing any system is constantly facing <strong>and</strong> trying to reduce. As Boyd argues in the openingpiece <strong>of</strong> A Discourse, for Boyd uncertainty prevails <strong>and</strong> is inherent in any system. It isunavoidable <strong>and</strong> insurmountable. This insight led Boyd to make uncertainty the nucleus fordeveloping theories about conflict. He turns uncertainty into a weapon. Besides the fact thatthe opponent probably experiences uncertainty because <strong>of</strong> a time lag between observation,analysis <strong>and</strong> action, through lack <strong>of</strong> time to digest all available information or through lessthan optimal sensors, uncertainty can also be magnified deliberately by creating ambiguity.Contradictory information, feints <strong>and</strong> deception are familiar tools for achieving this. Boydrestated them, adding that multiple <strong>and</strong> various actions simultaneously or during nonst<strong>and</strong>ardintervals (in addition to security <strong>and</strong> deception) prevent one to become predictable.That way, as just stated, there is no pattern in one’s behavior (across the physical, mental <strong>and</strong>moral dimensions) to recognize <strong>and</strong> if there are patterns, one changes them or alternatesbetween them. Variety with uncertainty thus causes ambiguity.This ties in with Boyd’s conviction that we should create mismatches. Time, rhythm<strong>and</strong> tempo are merely levers for creating mismatches. At the operational level, Boyd speaks<strong>of</strong> severely disrupting the adversary’s combat operation process used to develop <strong>and</strong> executehis initial <strong>and</strong> subsequent campaign plans. This disruption occurs by rapidly <strong>and</strong> repeatedlypresenting the enemy with a combination <strong>of</strong> ambiguous, but threatening events <strong>and</strong>deceptive, but non-threatening ones. This “out-looping” <strong>of</strong> the opponent, these multipleevents, compressed in time, this manipulation <strong>of</strong> friction, creating uncertainty <strong>and</strong> promotingambiguity, it all leads to the emergence <strong>of</strong> mismatches or anomalies, between those actionsthe opponent believes to threaten his survival <strong>and</strong> those which actually do. Going into theOODA-loop these mismatches feed back into the system to create an increase in mismatchin the next OODA cycle. Repeated <strong>and</strong> reinforced mismatches lead to a yawning gapbetween perception <strong>and</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> the strategic environment. <strong>The</strong> opponent has becomeisolated. This can also be effectuated by manipulating the social environment the opponentoperates in. Isolation also occurs if the social environment becomes hostile to the aims <strong>and</strong>actions <strong>of</strong> the opponent, negating him support he may be dependent upon.<strong>The</strong> enemy must eliminate these mismatches between perception <strong>and</strong> reality if hisreactions are to remain relevant-- that is, if he is to survive. He must attempt to re-establishinteraction with the environment. One’s operational aim should be to ensure the opponentcannot rid himself <strong>of</strong> these menacing anomalies by hampering his ability to processinformation, make decisions, <strong>and</strong> take appropriate action. In consequence, he can no longerdetermine what is being done to him <strong>and</strong> how he should respond. Ultimately, the adversary’sinitial confusion will degenerate into paralyzing panic, <strong>and</strong> his ability <strong>and</strong>/or willingness toresist will cease. Alternatively, he his rendered powerless because he is splintered <strong>and</strong> unableto cohere. His system has become a closed one in stead <strong>of</strong> an open system, <strong>and</strong> closedsystems are incapable <strong>of</strong> adaptation. At the strategic <strong>and</strong> gr<strong>and</strong> strategic levels other elementsare added, such as shaping the political <strong>and</strong> societal environment through creating a unifyingvision, dissolving the opponent’s moral fiber, destroying internal harmony, disorienting hismental images, attracting the uncommitted <strong>and</strong> weakening the abonds between the opponent<strong>and</strong> his allies, etc. Interaction <strong>and</strong> isolation are the key terms Boyd coins for this dynamic at themost abstract level.<strong>The</strong> narrow interpretation <strong>of</strong> the OODA loop also deemphasizes another essentialfeature <strong>of</strong> Boyd’s theory: developing, maintaining <strong>and</strong> reshaping one’s orientation, the box aroundwhich the loop graphically revolves. First <strong>of</strong> all, speed, or rather tempo, is not very useful ifone cannot adequately react on incoming information or one’s interpretation <strong>of</strong> events isflawed. Orientation shapes the way we interact with the environment. It determines how <strong>and</strong>what we observe, decide <strong>and</strong> act. It determines the character <strong>of</strong> the present OODA loops276

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