Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

The Indirect ApproachThe foregoing authors found their ideas incorporated in the influential arguments putforward by Basil Liddell Hart 34 , and Boyd’s work in turn bears close resemblance to the ideasof Liddell Hart, not surprising considering the fact that Boyd had read if not all, at least mostof his work 35 . His most popular an well-known book is Strategy 36 which was published in itsoriginal form as The Decisive Wars of History in the mid-1920s. He used it to develop his ideaof the “Indirect Approach”, which over time became elevated to a general rule and ultimatelya philosophical basis for the analysis of all war at all levels.Like Fuller the search for a stratagem that would avoid the massacres of WWI wasto occupy Liddell Hart during the interbellum and again like Fuller, Liddell Hart criticizedthe political and military leadership of WWI. Liddell Hart, and Boyd in his wake, used theideas of the French Neo-Napoleonic School of the late 19 th and the early 20 th Century toattack the strategies of the major powers in the 19 th century and WWI that were based onClausewitz’s faulty or incomplete analysis. This school unraveled the origins and nature ofNapoleonic strategy and took a critical look at Clausewitz’s interpretation of that strategy.The French school laid the foundations for a much deeper and fuller understanding ofNapoleon’s generalship and system of operation than had been offered by Jomini’s analysis.In dissecting Napoleon’s campaigns, the school emphasized Napoleon’s clear determinationof the decisive point and line of advance, the resolute and carefully coordinated marches andrapid concentration of all forces to overwhelm the enemy. Equally they highlighted theflexibility of his operational formation, the “battalion carré”, loosely dispersed until the lastmoment and maintaining its freedom of action to operate and strike in all directions.These principles, already proposed by De Bourcet in the 18 th century, had helped toleave the opponent in the dark and guessing regarding Napoleon’s intentions and ultimateline of attack. The pattern had been dispersion and only then concentration (vide Corbett here),with each of Napoleon’s operational plan having many branches or alternative options. Theschool also highlighted the use of deception, feints and diversions to create surprise,disorientation and miscalculation on the enemy’s part. They countered Clausewitz’s claimthat Napoleon had never engaged in strategic envelopment by citing the many instances ofNapoleon’s maneuvers against the enemy’s rear, one of the most fundamental patterns ofNapoleonic strategy 37 .Liddell Hart’s criticism of Clausewitz center on what he considered the threedominant theories in On War: the theory of absolute warfare, with its corollary of the nationin arms; the theory that one must concentrate fire against the main enemy; and the theorythat the true objective in war is the enemy’s armed forces so that everything is subject to thesupreme law of battle 38 . Clausewitz had been the “mahdi of mass” and mutual massacre andFoch in the pre-war era had been the amplifier for Clausewitz’s more extreme notes 39 . Boydwould agree and devote five pages for critique on Clausewitz.34 For the evidence of Liddell Hart's plagiatism see Gat (1998), pp. 146-150.35 The bibliography attached to Patterns of Conflict shows Boyd studied the following six works byLiddell Hart: A Science of Infantery Tactics Simplified (1926); The Future of Infantery (1933); The Ghost ofNapoleon (1934); The German Generals Talk (1948); and Strategy (1967).36 For this study I used the second revised edition of 1967, the one Boyd also read.37 Gat, pp.150-153.38 Ibid.39 Jay Luvaas, ‘Clausewitz: Fuller and Liddell Hart’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9 (1986), p.209.52