Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
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Blitzkrieg disrupts the connections between <strong>and</strong> within units thereby removingcohesion. <strong>The</strong> enemy system that relied on the combination <strong>of</strong> centers <strong>of</strong> gravity(constituting strengths, capabilities, objects or geographical features) <strong>and</strong> linkages betweenthose centers <strong>of</strong> gravity, is severely hurt by the disruption or destruction <strong>of</strong> these linkages. Orin Boyd’s words,Blitzkrieg generates multiple non-cooperative centers <strong>of</strong> gravity, as well as undermines orseizes those that adversary depends upon, in order to impede vigorous activity <strong>and</strong> magnifyfriction, thereby paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directedway 73 .Operating philosophy. <strong>The</strong> obvious question is <strong>of</strong> course ‘how do Blitzers simultaneouslysustain rapid pace <strong>and</strong> abruptly adapt to changing circumstances without losing cohesion orcoherence <strong>of</strong> their overall effort?’ To avoid collapse itself, Blitzkrieg employs, as the lastelement <strong>of</strong> the mechanism, a concept for comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control in which each unit at thedifferent levels <strong>of</strong> organization, from simple to complex, has its own specific OODA timecycle. <strong>The</strong> cycle-time increases commensurate with in increase in the level <strong>of</strong> organization, asone tries to control more levels <strong>and</strong> issues. As the number <strong>of</strong> events increase, the longer ittakes to Observe, Orient, Decide <strong>and</strong> Act. Thusthe faster rhythm <strong>of</strong> the lower units levels must work within the larger <strong>and</strong> slowerrhythm <strong>of</strong> the higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion orcoherency 74 .Boyd considered this issue essential, <strong>and</strong> actually refers to this as the first element <strong>of</strong> the‘Blitz Operating Philosophy’. He elaborates on it here, as well as in the subsequentpresentation ‘Organic Design for Comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Control’. According to Boyd, the tensionbetween the maintenance <strong>of</strong> control <strong>and</strong> cohesion on the one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong>fluid tactical situations is resolved by giving thelower level comm<strong>and</strong>ers wide freedom “within the overall Mind-Time-Space scheme”,to shape/direct their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at thetactical levels yet be in harmony with the larger pattern/slower rhythm associated withthe more general aim <strong>and</strong> larger effort at the strategic level.To ensure subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers stay within the boundaries <strong>of</strong> acceptable initiative the‘Mission concept, to fix responsibility <strong>and</strong> shape commitment at all levels <strong>and</strong> through allparts <strong>of</strong> the organism’. Likewise, Boyd advocates the use <strong>of</strong> a ‘Schwerpunkt concept throughall levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level <strong>of</strong> the organic wholecan operate at its own natural rhythm - without pulling the organism apart - instead <strong>of</strong> theslower pace associated with a rigid centralized control’ 75 .Quoting the WW II Blitzkrieg practitioner General Gunther Blumentritt, such aphilosophy, or scheme, ‘presupposes a common outlook based upon a body <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional<strong>of</strong>ficers who have received exactly the same training during the long years <strong>of</strong> peace <strong>and</strong> withthe same tactical education, the same way <strong>of</strong> thinking, identical speech, hence a body <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>ficers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear’. This in turn presupposes ‘an73 Ibid, p.71.74 Ibid, p.72.75 Ibid. Note the use <strong>of</strong> the term organism.200