Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

strategic thinking 103 . If so, it was dominated by progress in theoretical notions concerning thethreat and/or use of nuclear weapons within the context of the bi-polar world and it wasgolden for those involved in nuclear strategy making. This discourse reflected politicalconcerns in the US concerning international security. Since the Korean War the US saw itselfas ‘world policeman dedicated to combating Communism wherever it appeared’ and thispolicy culminated in the Vietnam War. US defense policy revolved around questionsconcerning nuclear strategy and capabilities 104 . Nuclear missions were emphasized andconventional weapons and training minimized. Strategic nuclear forces were considered upto well in the sixties an instrument to prevent war at all levels 105 .Although there was a constant debate concerning the right balance of conventionaland nuclear capabilities, conventional forces were discussed within the context of deterrenceand the debates were mostly focusing on the European theatre, and the dominant mode instrategy was one of annihilation of the enemy 106 . Limited wars (in terms of threat andinterests at stake and the overall level of national effort required for sustaining the war) suchas the one in Vietnam had only a very limited influence on the orientation of the US armedservices when choices had to made concerning system development, acquisitions anddoctrine 107 .The consequence of this was a general neglect of the operational level of war andinappropriate military doctrine when faced with North-Vietnamese guerrilla attacks 108 . TheVietnam War was in that respect a defining experience, revealing the consequences of thenation’s previous fixation on nuclear strategy at the expense of adequate preparations forconventional war. It provided a wake-up call regarding the kinds of defenses the UnitedStates and members of NATO would have to contend with in configuring themselves for apossible future counteroffensive against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe 109 .103 See for instance Ken Booth, ‘The Evolution of Strategic Thinking’, p. 35, in John Baylis, KenBooth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy, Theories and Policies, (New York, 1975).104 Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Indiana University Press,Bloomington, second edition, 1994), p.290. For a concise discussion of nuclear strategy from 1945-1985, see Lawrence Freedman, ‘The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists’, in Peter Paret (ed),Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ, 1986).105 Benjamin Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, (RAND, Santa Monica, 2000), p.35.106 Russell F. Weighly, The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy,(MacMillan Publishing Co, New York, 1973) p.476. In Europe US units were stationed to share riskand signal commitment, as well as to act as a trigger. They were not expected to hold off a large scaleSoviet invasion with conventional for long, and defense plans in the 1960’s did not exceed 90 days ofconventional fighting. See Phil Williams, ‘United States Defence Policy’, in Baylis, et al (1975), pp.196-206.107 See for instance Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, 1986), chapter 2; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, (Cornell University Press,Ithaca, 1991), chapter 1; Deborak Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, (Cornell UniversityPress, Ithaca, 1994), chapter 3.108 Hallion blames the dominant nuclear strategic discourse for a USAF institutional bias towardsnuclear capabilities, stating that ‘it was in Vietnam that the shortsightedness of overemphasizingnuclear war-fighting became most apparent’. The USAF, even its tactical component, was gearedtowards a nuclear war. One might have expected that Korea would have demonstrated the fallacy ofsuch a one-sided defense orientation, but it was considered an exception. Under the rubric ‘NewLook’ nuclear warfare contingency planning predominated. Valuable experience in air support was lostand had to be won the hard way again in Vietnam. See Hallion, pp.15-19.109 Ibid, p.48.67