Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

systems, not only are the specific sequences invariant, but the overall design of the processand the number of specialized personnel and other essential, non-substitutionableproduction resources allow only one way to reach the production goal. Loosely coupledsystems generally can design quick work arounds to come up with the same product.The concept of coupling is germane to the factor of risk and severity of failure.When something in the process does go wrong, what is the effect? Is it local or does itspread? How fast? Horizontally or (also) vertically? Generally, tightly coupled systems reactmore violently and in more directions, with several layered effects, than loosely coupledsystems 104 . In loosely coupled systems there is generally more time for recovery 105 . In tightlycoupled complex systems failure may not only be rapid, it may also manifest itself in variousdimensions, at various moments and in various parts in the system and probably in totallyunexpected places. The chance of incidents turning into accidents and system-widecatastrophe is larger in complex tightly coupled systems due to these factors, and thedemands made on failure prevention and recovery measures are very high. Interesting for thestudy of Boyd’s view on command and control, Perrow argues that the type of control oneselects depends on the level of complexity of a system, on the level of coupling ofsubsystems and processes and on the risks involved.To cope with the varying potential of failures, different strategies are available.Perrow proposes that in tightly coupled systems buffers, redundancies and substitutionsneed to be designed in; they must be thought of in advance. In loosely coupled systems thereis a better chance that expedient, spur of the moment buffers, redundancies andsubstitutions can be found, even though they were not planned ahead of time. Personnelfrom other departments or from outside can be quickly dispatched to help out, andalternative suppliers may be contracted, standard equipment may be bought off the shelf toreplace broken ones, etc 106 . These measures, in both types of systems can reduce somewhatthe frequency and severity of incidents, but cannot by themselves eliminate risk, and this inparticular applies to tightly coupled complex systems.An alternative theory, High Reliability Theory, developed in response to Perrow,and one closely mirroring Auftragtaktik principles, posits that organizations, also tightlycoupled ones, have more strategies available to enhance reliability 107 . They can for instancealso decentralize the authority to make decisions while equipping these lower level decisionmakers with a proper set of decision premises, training, skills, organizational objectives andappropriate culture. This is done in order to enable those closest to the problem at hand tosolve problems as they emerge. In this way rapid problem solving is ensured. And it givesthem the autonomy and competence to respond to complex interactions, once these reachthe surface, and correct them before tightly-coupled processes are set in motion whichmight lead to disaster.Additionally this same school of thought argues that those organizations that havesuccessfully weathered many storms were those that applied a strategy of conceptual slack: anumber of diverging theories pertaining to the organization’s technology and production104 For an in-depth account of the working of tightly coupled and non linear effects see in particularRobert Jervis, System Effects, Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, 1997).105 Perrow (1999), pp.93-94. See also Perrow, Complex Organizations; A Critical Essay (Glenview, Illinois,1979); and Jos A. Rijpma, ‘Complexity, Tight coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal AccidentsTheory and High Reliability Theory’, Journal of Continengies and Crisis Management, Volume 5, Number 1,March 1997.106 Perrow (1999), pp.94-95107 This school is often labelled the “High Reliability Theory” school whereas Perrow is associatedwith the “Normal Accident Theory” school. See Rijpma.149