Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

processes are maintained simultaneously. During a crisis onset a course of action is agreedupon only after intense debate concerning the appropriate theory. In this way complexinteractions which might have been overlooked when seen from one perspective are takeninto account.Finally this view posits that reliability will be enhanced, and the effects of futurefailures diminished, through organizational learning through real world practice of trial anderror, training, simulation while improving standards accordingly 108 . Complexity, however,may limit the effectiveness of them. Learning for instance from complex past events is ahighly ambiguous activity 109 . What happened because of what, is a most difficult questionwhen the effects occur delayed, in various and unexpected dimensions, because of the nonlinear interaction of failures and feedbacks of failures through multiple parts of a system.Likewise, in complex systems there may not be sufficient time to confer and agree on theproper course of action, making the option conceptual slack perhaps counterproductive.Redundancy may also enhance complexity if redundant parts, or processes, are located neareach other, in place or in time. One big blow may obliterate both, or if redundancy creates adependency on one contingent factor, it creates an extra liability and thus increasescomplexity. The two identical O-rings that failed in the Space Shuttle in 1986 both relied onoutside atmospheric conditions not exceeding certain identical limits. When they did, bothrings failed.This leaves the question concerning organization. Perrow discusses the questionabout centralization versus decentralization and concludes that both have merit for reducingrisk, enhancing reliability while accomplishing the job, but which one is appropriate dependson the level of coupling and complexity. Perrow argues that loosely coupled complexsystems such as universities generally allow a distinctly wide degree of decentralization.Perrow argues that complexity requires that those at the point of disturbance are free to interpret thesituation and take corrective measures, because that is where the incident is first noted, a view very close toBoyd’s. They should be allowed to diagnose the situation and take steps to contain theproblem before the effects spread to other parts of the system. Because the interactions areloosely tight, there is time to develop a coherent picture and appropriate responses. Togetherwith non-directive modes of synchronization and coordination, such as informal processes,shared culture, shared professional ethos, stable interaction patterns, slack and buffers,decentralization will allow a sufficient degree of control and sufficient failure recoverypotential. These element appear in Boyd’s work on command and control.On the other hand when a system is linear and tightly coupled, centralization isrequired because the situation is fully the mirror image of complex but loosely coupledsystems. Failures will result in predictable and visible effects. Responses can be preprogrammed,and rehearsed by all concerned, and subsequently initiated and controlled fromthe central authority. Top level detailed control and monitoring, and lower level meticulousobedience is required because response times need to be minimal and the response precise.Subsequently there is hardly room for lower level deviation/adjustment.Linear and loosely coupled systems can operate on either control set up.Centralization is possible because of linearity, decentralization is feasible because of the loosecoupling. A special problem is the class of complex and tightly coupled systems, which also108 Ibid, p.17.109 Ibid, p.19. See also Jervis (1997). For a well known example of complex effects from the militaryhistory see the debate on 'the effectiveness' of the strategic bombing campaigns during WW II inRichard Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (New York, 1981); or Richard Overy, Why The Allies Won(London 1995), Chapter 4, or James Roche and Barry Watts, ‘Choosing Analytic Measures’, Journal ofStrategic Studies 14 (June 1991), p. 176.150