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Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

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strategist’s task is not to create wise policy or successful schemes <strong>of</strong> military action, butrather to build <strong>and</strong> repair the bridges that connect the two.Third, it is extraordinarily difficult to train people to be competent strategists. <strong>The</strong>reis little in the training <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional politicians or soldiers that would equip them well forstrategic responsibilities. <strong>The</strong> military pr<strong>of</strong>essional is not taught how engagements should beused for the object <strong>of</strong> the war. Similarly, the rising politician is promoted for maturingpolitical skills. Where strategy is the bridge between military <strong>and</strong> political actions, it is notreadily apparent that someone is well versed in how to built it. But strategic excellence callsfor a type <strong>of</strong> judgment that cannot be taught the same way or in the same degree as tacticalexcellence.Fourth, strategy places unique physical <strong>and</strong> moral burdens on the would-bestrategist. As Clausewitz stated, strategic performance can be degraded by danger, fatigue,<strong>and</strong> anxiety born <strong>of</strong> uncertainty. Finally, friction interferes. Friction is the cluster <strong>of</strong> factorsthat cause the implementation <strong>of</strong> a plan to veer away from intention. Friction, according toClausewitz famous explanation, is the only concept that more or less corresponds to thefactors that distinguish real war from war on paper. <strong>The</strong> reason why friction can be sodamaging at the strategic level is because, by definition, that level must accommodate,integrate, <strong>and</strong> direct all <strong>of</strong> the activities that constitute war. At the strategic level <strong>of</strong>performance there is more that can go wrong 29 . Hence Clausewitz’ introduction <strong>of</strong> thenotion <strong>of</strong> genius as the quality <strong>of</strong> good comm<strong>and</strong>ers.To reinforce the last point, the difficulty <strong>of</strong> strategy becomes also readily apparentwhen one considers the following list <strong>of</strong> elements – or rather pervasive <strong>and</strong> interpenetratingdimensions – a strategist must fuse to form strategy, or conversely, what factors affect themaking <strong>and</strong> working <strong>of</strong> strategy 30 :People <strong>and</strong> politics Preparation for war <strong>War</strong> properPeople Economics Military operationsSociety Logistics Comm<strong>and</strong>Culture Organization GeographyPolitics Military administration FrictionEthics Information & intelligence Adversary<strong>Strategic</strong> theory & doctrine TimeTechnologyIndeed, strategy matters but is also very difficult, <strong>and</strong> the same holds true for strategictheory.<strong>The</strong> theory in strategic theory<strong>Strategic</strong> theory<strong>The</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> good strategy suggests strategic theory to be highly relevant, but thedifficulties <strong>of</strong> strategy also promise developing good strategic theory to be highlyproblematic. <strong>Strategic</strong> theory is a strange animal indeed, <strong>and</strong> as theory it deviates in some29 This summary <strong>of</strong> factors is an excerpt <strong>of</strong> Colin Gray, Explorations in <strong>Strategy</strong> (Greenwood Press,Westport Connecticut, 1996), pp.8-11.30 Gray, Modern <strong>Strategy</strong>, pp.23-44.18

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