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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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44 marcus giaquinto<strong>of</strong> knowing structures; in some cases we can know structures in more intimateways, by means <strong>of</strong> our visual capacities.We can say, broadly, that our ability to discern the structure <strong>of</strong> simplestructured sets is a power <strong>of</strong> abstraction; but we do not at present have anadequate account <strong>of</strong> the operative faculties or processes. That we have anability to discern structure is made evident by our manifest ability to spot astructural analogy. A striking case is provided by the history <strong>of</strong> biology. Thepattern <strong>of</strong> gene distribution in dihybrid reproduction postulated by Mendeliantheory can be found in the behaviour <strong>of</strong> chromosomes in meiosis (division <strong>of</strong> cellsinto four daughter cells, each with half the number <strong>of</strong> chromosomes <strong>of</strong> theparent) and subsequent fusion <strong>of</strong> pairs <strong>of</strong> daughter cells from different parents.The hypothesis that chromosomes are agents <strong>of</strong> inherited characteristics issuedfrom this observation, and was later confirmed.³Somehow biologists spotted the common pattern. But how? For an answerone might look to the large cognitive science literature on analogy. Thissubject is still at an early stage, with lots <strong>of</strong> speculation and many theories.Among the most promising are those based on the structure-mapping idea <strong>of</strong>Dedre Gentner.⁴ This, however, is no good for present purposes, because ittakes cognition <strong>of</strong> structure as given, and cognition <strong>of</strong> structure is preciselywhat we want to understand.I will proceed by suggesting some possibilities consistent with what I know<strong>of</strong> current cognitive science, in particular the science <strong>of</strong> vision and visualimagination. I will restrict consideration to just a few structures, mostly verysimple finite structures. But I will also say something about our grasp <strong>of</strong> infinitestructures.2.2 Visual grasp <strong>of</strong> simple finite structuresHere is a simpler biological example <strong>of</strong> a structured set. Consider the setconsisting <strong>of</strong> a certain cell and two generations <strong>of</strong> cells formed from that initialcell by mitosis, division <strong>of</strong> cells into two daughter cells, under the relation ‘xis a parent <strong>of</strong> y’. In this structured set there is a unique initial cell (initial, inthat no cell in the set is a parent <strong>of</strong> it), a first generation <strong>of</strong> two daughters and asecond generation <strong>of</strong> four grand-daughters, which are terminal (as they are notparents <strong>of</strong> any cell in the set). How can we have knowledge <strong>of</strong> the structure <strong>of</strong>this structured set?³ Priority is attributed to W. Sutton (1902). Others were hard on his heels. ⁴ Gentner (1983).

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