13.07.2015 Views

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

218 michael hallettthe observable world means that these interpretations are less than ideal asways <strong>of</strong> demonstrating ‘possibility’, and the same holds for investigations <strong>of</strong>independence. Secondly, the process <strong>of</strong> ideal extension as described aboveappears to rely heavily on the notion <strong>of</strong> embedding one mathematical theoryin another, and indeed Hilbert himself describes the procedure in just this wayin his 1919 lectures:Precisely stated, the method [<strong>of</strong> ideal elements] consists in this. One takes a systemwhich behaves in a complicated way with respect to certain questions which wewant to answer, and one transforms to a new system in which these problemstake on a simpler form, and which in addition has the property that it containsa sub-system isomorphic to the original system. ... The theorems concerning theobjects <strong>of</strong> the original system are now special cases <strong>of</strong> theorems <strong>of</strong> the new system,in so far as one takes account <strong>of</strong> the conditions which characterise the sub-systemin question. And the advantage <strong>of</strong> this is that the execution <strong>of</strong> the pro<strong>of</strong>s takesplace in the new system where everything becomes much clearer and easier totake in [übersichtlich]. (Hilbert, 1919, pp. 148–149, pp. 90–91 <strong>of</strong> the book)This procedure can be brought out, too, by looking more closely at thegeneral form <strong>of</strong> argument in the independence and relative consistency pro<strong>of</strong>s,a form first articulated by Poincaré in one <strong>of</strong> his explanations <strong>of</strong> the pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>the independence <strong>of</strong> the Parallel Postulate.²¹ The general procedure is this.Proving the independence <strong>of</strong> Q from P 1 , P 2 , ... , P n with respect to a givenconceptual scheme T 1 , that is, showing that there cannot be a derivation <strong>of</strong>Q from P 1 , P 2 , ... , P n , involves showing that, if there were, there would thenalso be a derivation <strong>of</strong> τ(Q) from τ(P 1 ), τ(P 2 ), ... ,τ(P n ) with respect toanother conceptual scheme T 2 ,where:(a) we know that each <strong>of</strong> the τ(P i ) aretheorems <strong>of</strong> T 2 ;(b) we know that the conceptual scheme T 2 can already derive¬τ(Q); (c) we assume (or know) that the scheme T 2 is not in fact inconsistent.Here, crucially, τ(P) is some map from formulas to formulas which preserveslogical structure. (This point was first articulated in Frege (1906).) An obviousvariant <strong>of</strong> this procedure can be used to prove the relative consistency <strong>of</strong> theoryT 1 with respect to T 2 . Hilbert puts it this way: After specifying a minimalPythagorean (countable) field <strong>of</strong> real numbers which determines an analyticmodel <strong>of</strong> the axioms for Euclidean geometry, he continues:We conclude from this that any contradiction in the consequences drawn fromour axioms would also have to be recognizable in the domain . (Hilbert(1899,p. 21); p. 455 in Hallett and Majer (2004))Thus, crucial to the investigation are what we might call base theories, thosethrough which the propositions <strong>of</strong> the ‘home theory’ are interpreted.²¹ See Poincaré (1891).

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!