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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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278 jamie tappendenmathematics have had a pr<strong>of</strong>ound effect on the emergence <strong>of</strong> the styles <strong>of</strong>mathematical reasoning that evolved in the subsequent century.My goal here is to describe the Riemann–Dedekind approach to ‘‘essentialcharacteristic properties’’ and indicate some <strong>of</strong> the mathematics that gives itsubstance. Along the way, I’ll spell out why I regard this as a promising andphilosophically pr<strong>of</strong>ound strategy for arriving at an account <strong>of</strong> naturalness inmathematical classification that can coalesce with an account <strong>of</strong> properties anddefinitions in general. To set the stage, I’ll first discuss the current situation in thegeneral metaphysics <strong>of</strong> properties as it pertains to the naturalness <strong>of</strong> mathematicalproperties. The point <strong>of</strong> the context-setting will be to explain why the waythings currently stand—especially the role <strong>of</strong> metaphysical intuitions, and thestock <strong>of</strong> examples used as reference points (plus the potential examples thatare not used)—make it difficult to address mathematical properties in anilluminating way.10.2 Analytic metaphysics: the ‘rules <strong>of</strong> the game’and the method <strong>of</strong> intuitionsEven if we acknowledge the Port Royal principle <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9,andensurethatour account <strong>of</strong> mathematical ‘classification and definition’ pays due heed to ‘thesubject matter being discussed’, we should work toward a synoptic treatment <strong>of</strong>mathematical and non-mathematical cases. It’s unlikely that mathematical andnon-mathematical reasoning are so disjoint as to exclude interesting points <strong>of</strong>overlap. In recent decades there has been a revival <strong>of</strong> old-fashioned metaphysicaldebates about the reality <strong>of</strong> universals, the artificial/natural distinction, andcognate topics. It might seem initially promising to draw on these debatesto illuminate the questions appearing in the survey essay. In this section I’llillustrate why the methods accepted as defining the ‘rules <strong>of</strong> the game’ in therelevant areas <strong>of</strong> contemporary analytic metaphysics are unlikely to help us asthings currently stand. This will force a different perspective on the problem;I’ll explore one possibility that centers on inductive practices <strong>of</strong> conjecture andverification in the subsequent section.Consider again the example from the survey essay: In algebraic numbertheory, the definition ‘a ̸= 1 is prime if, whenever a | bc then a | b or a | c’ is,in an important way, the ‘correct’, or ‘proper’ definition <strong>of</strong> ‘prime number’,and the school definition ‘n ̸= 1 is prime if it is evenly divided by only 1 andn’. is comparatively accidental. As in the suggested comparison—the changein the definition <strong>of</strong> kinetic energy made necessary by relativity theory—we

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