13.07.2015 Views

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

144 paolo mancosuvarious conceptual components <strong>of</strong> the model. In addition, further discussion<strong>of</strong> Steiner’s account, aimed at improving the account, is provided in Weberand Verhoeven (2002).Kitcher’s model will be described at length in the research paper followingthis introduction. Criticisms <strong>of</strong> unification theories <strong>of</strong> explanation asinsufficient for mathematical explanation have also been raised forcefully inTappenden (2005). In the next section, I would like to point out some aspects<strong>of</strong> Kitcher’s position that bring us back to the issue <strong>of</strong> generalization andabstraction. This will also be instrumental in introducing aspects <strong>of</strong> Kitcher’sthought relevant to the research paper to follow.5.4 Kitcher on explanation and generalizationI will start with a striking quote concerning generalization and its relation toexplanation within mathematics. It is taken from Cournot:Generalizations which are fruitful because they reveal in a single general principlethe rationale <strong>of</strong> a great many particular truths, the connection and commonorigins <strong>of</strong> which had not previously been seen, are found in all the sciences, andparticularly in mathematics. Such generalizations are the most important <strong>of</strong> all, andtheir discovery is the work <strong>of</strong> genius. There are also sterile generalizations whichconsist in extending to unimportant cases what inventive persons were satisfied toestablish for important cases, leaving the rest to the easily discernible indications<strong>of</strong> analogy. In such cases, further steps toward abstraction and generalization donot mean an improvement in the explanation <strong>of</strong> the order <strong>of</strong> mathematical truthsand their relations, for this is not the way the mind proceeds from a subordinatefact to one which goes beyond it and explains it. (Cournot, 1851, sect.16, Engl.trans. 1956, p.24, my emphasis)The central opposition in this text is that between fruitful generalizations vs.sterile generalizations. What distinguishes the two <strong>of</strong> them is that the formerare explanatory while the latter are not. Genius consists, according to Cournot,not in generalization tout court but in those generalizations that are able to revealthe explanatory order according to which mathematical truths are structured.A remarkably similar statement is found in an article by the mathematicianS. Mandelbrojt who claims that ‘La généralité est belle lorsqu’elle possédeun caractére explicatif’ and ‘l’abstraction est belle et grande lorsqu’elle estexplicative’ (Mandelbrojt, 1952, pp. 427–428). Also Mandelbrojt pointed outthat generalization can be cheap and boring. The generalization is informativewhen it is explanatory. Such explanatory generalizations can be obtained bythe right degree <strong>of</strong> abstraction and should show the object being studied in its

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!