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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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diagram-based geometric practice 73ensure that general claims are justified? The key point is how proceedingsin UG scopes are un-responsive, at the level <strong>of</strong> inference rules, to distinctivefeatures <strong>of</strong> instances.3. Modern logic employs what one might call representation-enforced (forshort, representational) unresponsiveness: the UG letter, placeholder for aninstance, lacks features on which differential responses to non-shared features <strong>of</strong>instances might be based. This ensures that formal inferences cannot depend onsuch distinctive features, and hence apply to all instances uniformly. Algebraicmethods in geometry since Descartes also exploit representational unresponsiveness:a letter, originally standing for a Euclidean line segment, lacks featuresto preclude it holding the place <strong>of</strong> a negative or even complex quantity, allowingone to display uniformities lacking uniform traditional geometric pro<strong>of</strong>.Drawn geometric diagrams, however, are not mere placeholders; theydisplay endless distinctive features to which geometrically pertinent responsesmight be made. It is therefore sometimes suggested, assimilating Euclideanreasoning generality to the representational unresponsiveness model, thatproper Euclidean pro<strong>of</strong> requires generic diagrams, ones only displaying featuresthat the demonstration indeed attributes.Such a conception does not allow uniform treatment <strong>of</strong> diagrams: thosewith, for example, irrelevant right angles or equalities <strong>of</strong> sides could not beused in demonstrations. But if there are generic diagrams, this objection wouldnot undercut the ability <strong>of</strong> demonstrations using them to justify their claimsalso for instances with exceptional (but non-singular) diagrams that do haveall features the demonstration attributes; even if they have further features aswell. (That Locke somehow lacks this flexibility would threaten to render hisidea-<strong>of</strong>-a-triangle paradoxally equilateral.)Nonetheless, among further objections to generic-diagram conceptions <strong>of</strong>demonstration (medieval manuscripts notoriously use non-generic diagrams,which may or may not reflect earlier practice; how generic must a genericdiagram be?), the emergence <strong>of</strong> multiple non-exceptional cases seems fatal:because each case demonstration requires attributions that are false in the othercases, such pro<strong>of</strong>s have no generic diagram spanning their UG scope.4. Representation-enforced unresponsiveness to distinctive features <strong>of</strong> instances,however, is not the only appropriate way to justify general conclusions!Even if the (placeholder for the) instance has distinctive features to whichhumans might respond with claims <strong>of</strong> the very sort being justified, standards<strong>of</strong> reasoning may sucessfully prohibit such differential response.This is fundamental to the generality- and understanding-generating quality<strong>of</strong> a great range <strong>of</strong> reasoning (including the use <strong>of</strong> examples in ethics). Evensome formal systems <strong>of</strong> quantifier logic enforce uniformity across instances

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