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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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62 marcus giaquinto<strong>of</strong> every such sequence; hence that the validity <strong>of</strong> induction up to ω 2 can bemade immediately evident.What I think Gödel had in mind here is that, using the ω-square representation,there is a visuo-spatial way <strong>of</strong> telling that every decreasing sequence<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> ω 2 terminates. From this fact the validity <strong>of</strong> induction upto ω 2 quickly follows, a fact which Gödel presumably took as backgroundknowledge for his readers. But how can we tell that every decreasing sequence<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> ω 2 terminates? Thinking <strong>of</strong> ω 2 in terms <strong>of</strong> an ω-square asdescribed earlier, it is obvious that for any decreasing sequence, among rowscontaining members <strong>of</strong> that sequence, there will be an uppermost row; andthat, <strong>of</strong> the members <strong>of</strong> the sequence in that row there will be a leftmostmember—call it α. Then, recalling the ordering <strong>of</strong> ω 2 , it is clear that α isthe least member <strong>of</strong> the sequence: so the decreasing sequence terminates. Thisway <strong>of</strong> acquiring the knowledge is relatively immediate, and is concrete in thesense that it has an experiential element. This may have been what Gödel hadin mind, but we do not know. Either way, it does substantiate all but one <strong>of</strong>his claims. It does not support Gödel’s implied claim that one can grasp at oneglance all the structural possibilities for decreasing sequences in ω 2 ,forthereare decreasing sequences with elements that occur arbitrarily far to the right inan ω-square.¹⁹ But Gödel’s other claims are untouched by this.It is credible that we can have the same kind <strong>of</strong> grasp <strong>of</strong> the structure <strong>of</strong> ω 2as we can have <strong>of</strong> N, and that this plays a role in actual mathematical thinking.Investigation is needed to determine how much further into the transfinite wemay go before this kind <strong>of</strong> cognition <strong>of</strong> ordinal structure becomes impossible.At present I do not see how to extend the kind <strong>of</strong> account I have suggestedfor ω 2 to ω ω . But I think that we can form a visual category specification forω-many layers <strong>of</strong> ω-squares, an ω-cube, thus forming a representation <strong>of</strong> ω 3 .Therewouldbeatopω-square, and beneath each ω-square another one. Theordering within ω-squares is unchanged; for elements α and β in differentω-squares, α precedes β if and only if α’s ω-square is above β’s ω-square.This uses our natural representation <strong>of</strong> space as extending infinitely in each <strong>of</strong>three dimensions. As our natural represention <strong>of</strong> space lacks a fourth dimension,it is clear that we cannot get to ω 4 from ω 3 in the same way as we got to ω 3from ω 2 . What we can do is to take each element <strong>of</strong> an ω-cube to representan ω-string, an ω-square or an ω-cube, thus getting a way <strong>of</strong> thinking <strong>of</strong> ω 4 ,ω 5 or ω 6 . But this way <strong>of</strong> using a visual category specification for ω-cubesis not a way <strong>of</strong> extending it to get another visual category specification. Canwe imagine putting an ω-cube in each position in an ω-cube, as opposed¹⁹ Robert Black pointed this out in discussion.

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