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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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mathematical concepts and definitions 267calculations. The challenge for the analyst <strong>of</strong> reasoning is to find some way <strong>of</strong>characterizing what kind <strong>of</strong> success it was that Dedekind achieved.Returning to the main line, we can draw a moral about the division <strong>of</strong>mathematical concepts into artificial and non-artificial. Whether or not aconcept is ‘disjunctive’ in a way that gives it a grue-like artificiality is notsomething we can just read <strong>of</strong>f the syntax <strong>of</strong> the definition. This example (orrather, this example plus the rest <strong>of</strong> the mathematics whose surface I’ve onlyscratched) illustrates how inextricably judgements as to the naturalness andproper definition <strong>of</strong> basic concepts are embedded in mathematical method.Let’s remind ourselves <strong>of</strong> the orienting question: (i) is the Legendre symbolartificial or natural and (ii) how can we tell? The answer is (i) natural, and(ii) that is a mathematical question, to which a substantial answer can begiven. The richness and depth <strong>of</strong> the mathematical rationale provides thebasic answer to the suggestion that the mathematical naturalness <strong>of</strong> a property,function, or relation can be shrugged <strong>of</strong>f as ‘pragmatic/mere mathematicalconvenience’. It is hard to see how this assessment <strong>of</strong> one category as betterthan others is different than cognate assessments in the natural sciences orphilosophy. This response won’t work against someone who maintains thatall such distinctions <strong>of</strong> natural and nonnatural are ‘merely pragmatic’ matters<strong>of</strong> ‘philosophical/physical/chemical/biological/etc. convenience’ but that is aseparate topic. Our point is that mathematics is on an equal footing.9.4 Prime numbers: real and nominal definitionrevisitedWe’ve observed that a common pattern in mathematics is the discovery <strong>of</strong>the proper definition <strong>of</strong> a word with an already established meaning. TheLegendre symbol can be redefined in light <strong>of</strong> later knowledge, to reflectthe best explanations <strong>of</strong> the facts. This may appear to be in tension witha longstanding philosophical presumption that the definition introducing anexpression is somehow privileged as a matter <strong>of</strong> meaning. But the unfamiliarity<strong>of</strong> the Legendre symbol may make the point seem abstruse. It will beworthwhile to look at a comfortingly familiar example: ‘prime number’. Welearn the original definition in elementary school: n ̸= 1 is prime if it is evenlydivided by only 1 and n. OverN the familiar definition is equivalent to:a ̸= 1 is prime if, whenever a divides a product bc (written a | bc) thena | bor a | c. In extended contexts, the equivalence can break down. For example,in Z[ √ 5i] ={a + b √ 5i | a, b ɛ Z}, 2 is prime in the original sense, but not in

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