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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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understanding pro<strong>of</strong>s 327possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in metres and centimetres; thedifference is merely one <strong>of</strong> convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance,calculations in some system <strong>of</strong> measurement demand more time and trouble thanis possible for us to give them. (§569)Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expressions <strong>of</strong> our interest,and direct our interest. (§570)One finds similar views on the role <strong>of</strong> specifically mathematical concepts inWittgenstein’s other works. For example, we find the following in the Remarkson the Foundations <strong>of</strong> Mathematics:The mathematical Must is only another expression <strong>of</strong> the fact that mathematicsforms concepts.And concepts help us to comprehend things. They correspond to a particularway <strong>of</strong> dealing with situations.Mathematics forms a network <strong>of</strong> norms. (Wittgenstein, 1956, VI, §67)This stands in contrast to the traditional view <strong>of</strong> mathematics as a collection <strong>of</strong>definitions and theorems. For Wittgenstein, a proposition is not just an object<strong>of</strong> knowledge, but, rather, something that shapes our behavior:The mathematical proposition says to me: Proceed like this! (§72)With respect to propositions in general, we find in On Certainty:204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—butthe end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not akind <strong>of</strong> seeing on our part, it is our acting, which lies at the bottom <strong>of</strong> the languagegame. (Wittgenstein, 1969)This way <strong>of</strong> thinking challenges us to view mathematics in dynamic terms,not as a body <strong>of</strong> knowledge, but, rather, as a complex system that guides ourthoughts and actions. We will see in Part II <strong>of</strong> this essay that this provides apowerful and fundamentally useful way <strong>of</strong> thinking about the subject.12.4 A functionalist epistemologyI have proposed that a theory <strong>of</strong> mathematical understanding should be atheory <strong>of</strong> mathematical abilities. In ordinary circumstances, when we say, forexample, that someone understands a particular pro<strong>of</strong>, we may take them topossess any <strong>of</strong> the following:• the ability to respond to challenges as to the correctness <strong>of</strong> the pro<strong>of</strong>, andfill in details and justify inferences at a skeptic’s request;

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