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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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the euclidean diagram (1995) 123AFig. 4.10.C B Dand making objection, and may make distinctive arrangements for carryingthem on, such as the division <strong>of</strong> labor that Proclus records; but we see nooverriding significance to the intellectual function <strong>of</strong> the practice in suchdivisions. In particular, we just saw how case and objection are easy to confuse,sometimes indistinguishable, sometimes distinguished only by whether theoutcome is comfortable to the protagonist; and in any case tend both to besubmerged in revision <strong>of</strong> the text.Proclus records ample instances <strong>of</strong> critical scrutiny <strong>of</strong> The Elements. Manypoint to the need to state a proposition just right. The ‘Euclidean’ text, whichProclus <strong>of</strong>ten praises for its precise formulation, is probably the product <strong>of</strong>centuries <strong>of</strong> refinement <strong>of</strong> formulation after Euclid as well as before.For example, consider the statement <strong>of</strong> I.14: If, with any straight line AB,and at a point B on it, two straight lines BC and BD not lying on the sameside <strong>of</strong> AB make the adjacent angles ABC and ABD taken together equal totwo right angles, the two straight lines will be in a straight line with another(Fig. 4.10). (Adapted from Heath, Euclid I, p. 276.)Proclus (297–298) gives a counterexample <strong>of</strong> Porphyry to show that thecondition ‘not lying on the same side’ cannot be omitted: if we do so, aninitial diagram with different appearance will satisfy the remaining conditions,but not the conclusion.To our sensitivity, this makes absolutely clear that the added conditionis needed. It replaces otherwise implicit contributions <strong>of</strong> the diagram to thestatement <strong>of</strong> a proposition, by a fuller verbal description <strong>of</strong> the diagram. Butwhy must one do so? Although this is not the way Euclid’s text works, wecan imagine treating the initial diagram as part <strong>of</strong> the statement text <strong>of</strong> aproposition. One could then strip the discursive statement <strong>of</strong> I.14 down to:Let three line segments as in the diagram have two adjacent angles taken togetherequal to two right angles. Then the two straight lines making the two angles withthe third will be in a straight line with another. Thistooseemstowork.Ifthediagram is treated as part <strong>of</strong> the statement, we seem to have the same effectas from the verbally more complete Euclidean version. Even in Proclus, a

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