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Mancosu - Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (Oxford, 2008).pdf

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the euclidean diagram (1995) 107never ambiguity as to the appearance <strong>of</strong> the diagram formed under properdiscipline from given data, adequacy <strong>of</strong> case distinction still requires controlover complete families <strong>of</strong> diagrams.But how are participants to see whether a given selection <strong>of</strong> variantdiagrams (after a construction complicates the diagram, or even at the outset <strong>of</strong>argument) is exhaustive <strong>of</strong> the possibilities which require separate argument? Ifit is not exhaustive, how to locate further alternatives? Traditional practice lacksprocedure either to certify completeness <strong>of</strong> case distinctions, or to generatevariants. Except in special situations (negation <strong>of</strong> equalities) there are nodiscursive arguments to this effect; and while one would expect to look tothe diagram for suggestions in locating variant appearances, there is no hint <strong>of</strong>clear-cut diagram-based procedures to do so.Traditional geometrical practice largely lacks artifact support that wouldallow participants to survey diagram appearances once and for all, or evento recognize when they had done so. First, the possibilities for free choices,whether at the beginning or along the way in building up a diagram, areunsurveyable. Second, (even without ambiguity as to the appearance <strong>of</strong>diagrams properly constructed from given data) the relationship between thosefree metric choices and ultimate diagram appearance is unsurveyable. Diagramscome one at a time; having made one set <strong>of</strong> choices, we may hope to tell theconsequences; but we thereby usually gain little grasp <strong>of</strong> the range <strong>of</strong> possiblealternative outcomes from other choices.These limitations <strong>of</strong> artifact support in traditional geometry may be broughtout by contrast with a quite limited but historically significant exception: locusdescriptions <strong>of</strong> curves. A good case is the well known result (extending III.21and converse) that the locus <strong>of</strong> points O that make a fixed given angle POQwith two given points P and Q is a circle through P and Q. Inaweaksense, this gives a survey <strong>of</strong> all possible ways, given P, Q, and the angle, <strong>of</strong>locating O to satisfy the condition. It allows us to read <strong>of</strong>f a little about (say)how triangles OPQ <strong>of</strong> this type would interact and form regions with furtherdiagram elements. We can tell what the possibilities are for O to lie withrespect to other regions in the same diagram, by seeing which such regionscontain points <strong>of</strong> the diagram; we can find all such triangles OPQ with sideparallel to a given line by intersecting the circle with the lines through Por Q parallel to the given one... But we still can’t read <strong>of</strong>f all such trianglesOPQ; we can draw them one at a time, but if we draw more than one ortwo, the diagram becomes too cluttered to be <strong>of</strong> any use (we lose appearancecontrol).The relationship between case distinctions and discrepancies in capacityfor uniform proceeding is, however, quite general. One may also come to

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