BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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power of a spirit to act according to its representations. 44 A spirit [Geist]
is defined as a living substance which has ideas, or which thinks. 45
The fact that Crusius introduces his work with a chapter on the will is
no coincidence. He ascribes to the will a basic role in human life. This
may not be evident at first sight. He operates with a rather traditional
distinction between understanding [Verstand], defined as the power that
makes it possible for us to find the truth, and will, defined as the capacity
to act, and he argues that they are different Grundkräfte. 46 However, he
immediately undermines this distinction by claiming the will to be an allpervasive
power, permeating the understanding as well as the body. It
affects the understanding, for instance, by making it possible for it to
direct its attention towards a certain topic over time. Also, in order to
develop a proper understanding, we have to use it, which requires
practice, which again presupposes an enduring will, he argues. 47 Finally,
he explains the existence of certain basic concepts by referring to what he
calls ‘basic desires’ [Grundbegierden], which are also expressions of the
will. Thus, for instance, the concept of an object [der deutliche Begriff
des Objectes] is based on such a desire. 48 How far this undermines his
distinction between the understanding and the will, I shall not say.
However, it certainly gives the will an essential function in the cognitive
process.
The will, Crusius suggests, also permeates all parts of the body and its
functions. He distinguishes between various classes of embodied acts;
actiones animales, which are embodied acts driven by desires of which
we are conscious; and action vitales and action naturales which are
unconscious. An example of the latter is the process of digestion. These
acts, he argues, probably have their origin in the will, even if we are not
aware of doing them, and even if they do not require a deliberate
decision. 49
In addition to this the will is, of course, also involved in
embodied acts deliberately performed.
The ideas investigated so far do not in themselves constitute a
pragmatic theory of rationality. However, by making the will an allpervasive
power, a theoretical basis is laid on which such a theory may be
constructed. If we look at the will as the active principle in man, and if
44
Crusius (1969), 5.
45
Ibid., 5.
46
Ibid., 9.
47
Ibid., 33.
48
Ibid., 116-117.
49
Ibid., 39.
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIED PRACTICE