BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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THE BODY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL
time however, it is also activity, or awareness of activity. Falkenstein fails
to see this point when he claims that the Kantian idea that space is given
entails that it is given prior to any activity of the agent. 19
Within the context of the present interpretation, we may explain,
finally, how Kant, as part of his doctrine of the transcendental ideality of
space, may legitimately contend that, transcendentally considered, the
notion of space refers only to our way of intuiting the world, and cannot
be used to qualify objects as they exist independently of this (cf. e.g. A
24f/B 39ff.). If we accept that space, transcendentally considered, is
embodied movement, or our awareness of such movement, and if we
accept that Kant’s statement for instance at A 24f/B 39ff. is based on this
insight, then I think that Kant’s point is that, transcendentally
considered, this is the only space we know. Why? Let us return for a last
time to the example of the ball. According to what we called the
empirical perspective, the ball is simply there, in space, with a fixed
shape, independently of whether you observe it or not. The ball is what
Kant characterizes as empirically real and so are its spatial features, i.e.
its extension and shape. According to what we called the transcendental
perspective, however, the ball is not simply there. Within this perspective
we place brackets, as it were, around the empirical world. As we place
brackets around this world, what is left qua space, is nothing but our own
self-conscious movement. Within the transcendental perspective, this is
space, and moreover, it is the only space we know. And as long as we
remain strictly within this perspective, we cannot talk about any other
space. Consequently, we must also abstain from any talk that ascribes
spatial qualities to objects as they exist in abstraction from our way of
perceiving them. This, I think, is Kant’s basic insight when he insists that
the notion of space cannot be applied to the things in themselves. 20
Notice, finally, that the Kantian idea of the transcendental ideality of
space does not demand that we give up our ordinary confidence in the
empirical reality of space. The Kantian idea principally concerns our
way of experiencing this space. It involves a transcendental reminder of
19
As I have argued, Falkenstein may be right in a limited sense, but not when we
take into account our experience of the spatial form of objects.
20
This I take to be also Kaulbach’s idea, when discussing Kant’s critical theory of
space, he states: ‘Die Figur selbst ... […] ist keine an sich seiende Wesenseinheit,
sondern spiegelt die Handlung des Beschreibens wider: Da sie diese Bewegung
spiegelt, ist die Figur Ausdruck der Bewegung des Beschreibens. Unabhängig und
ausserhalb dieser Bewegung ist sie nichts.’ (Kaulbach (1968), 274.)