BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL SCHEMATISM 183
theory of geometrical schematism, suggested by the triangle example, as
referring simply to these well known practices of geometers?
At first glance the answer appears negative. From the context in
which the example is stated, we seem forced to conclude that the
construction in question is different in kind from the one used by a
geometer constructing a triangle on a piece of paper. Kant says, namely,
that the construction in question is performed in the mind, i.e. by the
imagination (cf. e.g. A 141/B 180). Kant’s association of schematism and
imagination seems to demand an internalist interpretation of the
schematism theory: whatever constructions the theory refers to, they
cannot be conceived of as external constructions.
I will argue that the constructions referred to in the schematism
chapter must after all be conceived of as external, embodied practices. A
key point of my argument concerns the question of how to understand
the term ‘imagination’ as used in Kant’s theory of schematism. I will
argue that, contrary to how it may seem, the Kantian term ‘imagination’
does not refer exclusively to an inner mental realm. First, however, let us
take a brief look at some general positions developed relative to Kant’s
terminology of construction, such as when he associates a schema with
the act of drawing. 14
6.3 Mental constructions?
Hardly any reader of the Critique, not even the most hard-headed
proponent of an analytic interpretation, has failed to notice that in the
cognitive theory of this text Kant develops and applies a wide repertoire
of terms that in everyday use refer to acts of manipulation and
construction, and not only in the schematism chapter but also in other
parts of the Transcendental logic. Several interpretative strategies have
been developed in response.
One sees these terms as referring to mental acts or other kind of
cognitive processes taking place in the mind. In this group we find
Kitcher, Ros, Wolff and others, who read Kant’s terminology as
expressing a transcendental psychology which, far from being outdated,
still has important insights to offer. 15
Ros represents a version of this
position when, discussing the schematism chapter, he argues that it is
14
Other terms which in ordinary language likewise refer to overt acts of
construction will be discussed below.
15 Cf. Kitcher (1990), Ros (1990) and Wolff (1963).