BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE
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pragmatic perspective of his anthropology is from now on to form a
superior perspective under which he wants to subordinate his whole
academic enterprise. Exactly what this says about the relation between
his anthropology and his transcendental philosophy is not evident.
Brandt argues that there are no systematic relations between these two
branches of his philosophy, 15
while Pitte, Munzel and others insist that
there are, citing as evidence, for instance, the passage from the Logic
quoted at the beginning of this chapter. 16 Munzel argues specifically that
there is a connection between Kant’s anthropology and pedagogy and his
critical ethics as found in the Critique of practical reason. In his
anthropology and pedagogy Kant discusses the means and strategies by
which man realizes his true vocation as a citizen of the moral world
order. The second Critique, she maintains, cannot be properly
understood in abstraction from these means and strategies. 17
I will argue that a parallel argument may also be advanced where the
first Critique is concerned, i.e., its cognitive theory, epistemology and
transcendental idealism. This I also take to be the basic intuition
underlying Pitte’s attempt at a positive re-evaluation of Kant’s
anthropology. 18 However, like Munzel he ends up emphasizing the
connection between Kant’s anthropology and his critical ethics, and does
not quite succeed in integrating other parts of Kant’s transcendental
philosophy into his interpretative approach. 19
His position may at best be
described as ambiguous. For instance, at one point he claims that Kant’s
critical analysis of cognition provides little occasion for the introduction
of anthropological elements. 20 In his introduction to an English
translation of Kant’s Anthropology, however, he argues that Kant’s
theory of cognition, as we find it in this work, may also help us to better
15
Brandt (1999), 50.
16
Pitte (1971 and 1978), Munzel (1999).
17
Cf. Munzel (1999), 8ff. Recently other scholars have also developed a similar
perspective. For a brief survey, cf. Zammito (2002), 347ff. Zammito himself
seems also to be sympathetic towards this view.
18
Cf. Pitte (1971), 32.
19
Referring to the last part of the Critique, and interpreting the text as a whole in
the light of this part, Pitte argues that its orientation is basically practical (Pitte
(1971), 33). From this Pitte further concludes that Kant intended the Critique to
be a part of a comprehensive philosophy, the aim of which was to help realize the
good life for the human race (Pitte 1971), 36. Within this system, Pitte argues,
Kant considered his ethics to be the highest discipline.
20
Pitte (1971), 32.