BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

approach. 114 At the same time, the purportedly useful or pragmatic aspect
of anthropology was declared by Kant to be an ideal for university
studies in general as well. A university education should not only be
theoretical [für die Schule], but it should also be of use in the future
everyday life of the student. 115
Kant’s pragmatic anthropology is a science explicitly dealing with
man as an embodied being. Its object is not mind or body, but both. The
idea that the mind is embodied is one of the most fundamental ideas on
which the discipline is based. This makes the Anthropology a fascinating
source of information for those interested in Kant’s ideas in this field.
The work is divided into two parts. The first is called ‘anthropological
didactic’ and consists of two books, one about the cognitive faculties, and
the other about pleasure and displeasure. The second deals with the
character of a person, the character of the sexes, and so on.
The cognitive theory presented in the Anthropology is expressed in
more or less the same terminology as that used in the Inaugural
dissertation and the Critique. A fundamental distinction is drawn
between sensible and intellectual representations, the first derived from
effects passively received by the mind [Gemüt], the second produced by
the activity of the mind itself. 116 The faculty corresponding to the passive
side of the mind is called ‘sensibility’ [Sinnlichkeit], while the faculty
corresponding to the active side of the mind is called ‘understanding’
[Verstand]. 117 This term is again used in two ways, sometimes as a
general term covering the higher cognitive faculty in general, at other
times in a more limited sense, denoting only the lower part of this faculty,
along with the power of judgment [Urteilskraf] and reason [Vernunft]
which are then defined as superior members of the higher cognitive
faculty. 118
A highly interesting aspect of the Anthropology is that cognition is
here described using the same terminology as that of the Critique. Both
works describe the same cognitive apparatus. However, in the Critique
nothing is said explicitly about how this apparatus relates to the body. It
is otherwise in the Anthropology. Here cognition is explicitly described as
embodied. In the Critique sensation is being described as the affection of
the mind [Gemüt]. However, no mention is made of whether this mind
114
Ibid., 10.
115
Ibid., 10-11.
116
Ak VII: 140, cf. also Ak VII: 196.
117
Ak VII: 196.
118
Ak VII: 196-7.
THE EMBODIED MIND
57