BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

BODY AND SPACE
Above I argued that, according to the theory of Rousseau, Tetens
and the other authors examined at the beginning of this chapter, touch is
not only taken to be essential because it is the sense by which our first
and most basic concepts of space are formed but it is also taken to be
essential in being the sense on which the functioning of all the other
senses is modeled. I think that the last example examined may be used as
evidence that Kant’s thoughts on the matter followed the same lines, at
least where hearing is concerned. In hearing, we do not touch objects
directly, but in Kant’s analysis what happens is structurally similar to an
act of touching. When I touch an object with my hand, this is an active
movement. The resulting concept of the spatial form of the object is in
part caused by this movement. However, just as important as my own
movement is the resistance offered by the object. Without this resistance,
I should not be able to form a concept of its form.
The structure of this event, I think, is also present in the example of
the blind person. Standing in the room, not knowing where its walls are,
he uses his voice, and by noting how it is echoed by the room’s walls, he
understands where they are relative to himself. What is the structure of
this event? First the blind person acts by making a sound with his voice.
Secondly, due to the resistance of the walls, this sound is reflected back to
his ears. And once again the resulting concept of the spatial dimensions
of the room is the result of both. Both the initial act and the resistance of
the object, in this case the walls, are required.
Metaphorically speaking, we might say that the sound in the above
example is like a hand. By means of the sound, the observer reaches out
for an object. When the sound hits the object, it is like the moment of
touch, and the resistance causing the reflection of the sound is like the
resistance felt when he literally touches an object, only now it is
experienced indirectly, mediated by the sounds reflected back to his ear. I
have found no evidence to suggest that Kant conceived of the act of
seeing in an analogous way, but by arguing along the same lines as
Descartes did in his example of the man with the sticks, he could well
have extended the above model to include this sense as well.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter I have given a brief outline of what I have called Kant’s
embodied theory of space and I have argued that this theory, at least in
part, may be seen as inspired by authors such as Condillac, Tetens and
Rousseau. However, I have also argued that it may be seen as the logical
consequence of some basic Kantian ideas. If, for instance, we start out
from the idea expressed explicitly both in Dreams of a spirit-seer and the
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