BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE 171
5.10 § 26 of the B-deduction
The aim of § 26 of the B-deduction is to explain how it is possible for the
categories to be the concepts by which the objects of our senses become
objects for us. In order to explain this, Kant first introduces the notion of
a synthesis of apprehension, well known from the A-edition, but not
previously mentioned in the B-deduction. 17
Synthesis of apprehension, he
explains, is the synthesis by which the manifold of an empirical intuition
is put together so that a perception [Wahrnehmung] is produced.
First of all I remark that by the synthesis of apprehension I
understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition
through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as
appearance), becomes possible. (B 160)
In order for us to have a perception an imaginative synthesis is required.
This reminds us of the argument of the A-deduction in which perception
was likewise said to require imagination (A 120). Then in a footnote at B
161 Kant returns to discuss space. Space considered as an object, that is,
space as we deal with it in geometry, contains more than just the pure
form of intuition. It also contains the synthesis of the manifold given
according to this form in an intuitive representation [anschauliche
Vorstellung]. He then proceeds by drawing a distinction between space,
considered as the form of intuition, and ‘formal space’. While space,
considered as the form of intuition, contains nothing but a manifold,
formal space also contains unity (B 161, note). As I understand it, what is
here called formal space is space determined by the categories, i.e., by
the synthesis of the understanding. If this is right, then the distinction
between the form of space and formal space is not new. Then the passage
just quoted is just another example of what seems to be Kant’s basic
point in the B-deduction, that only the determination of time and space
requires synthesis, not their production.
Then, however a conceptual shift is announced. The unity of formal
space, Kant tells us, was ascribed to sensibility in the Transcendental
aesthetic, and rightly so. This unity, namely, is prior to all concepts.
However, he continues, it presupposes a synthesis that does not belong to
the senses. And only through this synthesis is the concept of time and
space possible.
17
If my interpretation above was right, however, it was indirectly referred to by
the term’ figurative synthesis’