BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

54
THE EMBODIED MIND
matter exists in time and space, Kant argues. When it comes to the
immaterial, however, this is not so. Its presence in the spatio-temporal
world is virtual. 98 In a footnote at the end of the text Kant then describes
the mind and its relation to the body as a special case of the relation
between the immaterial and the material generally understood. 99 In being
immaterial [unstofflich] the mind is not in itself spatial, he explains. That
is, having a spatial location is not part of its original nature. An embodied
mind may still be said to have a spatial location, however, through its
relation with a body.
… the soul is not in interaction with the body because it is detained in
a certain place in the body; a determinate place in the universe is
rather attributed to the soul because it is in reciprocal interaction with
a certain body; and when this interaction is interrupted any position
it has in space is destroyed. 100
What theory of the mind is implied here? As before, this is not easy to
decide. The fact that Kant includes in this passage a remark concerning
the dissolution of the community of mind and body, suggest that he is
taking it for granted that the mind survives the body, and even that it
may have an existence independent of it. The exact status of this idea is,
however, not specified. At present, I will simply draw attention to the
notion of virtual presence. Kant does not say exactly what he means by
saying that the mind’s presence in the body is virtual. The term ‘virtual’
has an equivalent in the German virkungsfähig. 101 Even if the textual
evidence is not unambiguous, I think this suggests that Kant, in the
above passage, puts forward the idea that the mind is present in the body
qua activity in a wide sense.
If this interpretation is right, it seems to point in two directions. First,
it points back to Dreams of a spirit-seer. Here we find the idea expressed
that the mind is present in the body qua activity, and that the mind is
therefore present in every part of the body. It also points forwards to the
Critique, and the argument of the A-version of the second paralogism
examined above. As we saw, Kant there suggests that a thinking being,
which due to the constitution of our sensibility appears to us as extended,
may well be conceived of as having conscious thoughts. Moreover, even
98
Ak II: 414.
99
Ak II: 419.
100
Ak II: 419.
101
Cf. Hofmeisters German dictionary (1955).