BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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SPATIAL EXPERIENCE AND THE BODY IN THE CRITIQUE
Kant’s introduction of the imagination suggests that the original
model according to which the mind is organized into sensibility and
understanding does not tell the whole story. This is further confirmed at
A 94. We have now reached the part of the transcendental deduction
that was rewritten in the B-edition. In what follows I will first examine
the A-version of this part of the deduction, and then the B-version.
At A 94 Kant tells us that there are three original faculties [Quellen,
Fähigkeiten oder Vermögen] of the mind forming the conditions of the
possibility of experience. These are sense, imagination and apperception
(A 94). The understanding, surprisingly, is not mentioned among the
three original faculties of the mind. A bit later in the A-deduction the
understanding is, somewhat vaguely, said to be produced by the three
original ones. Then, at A 119, he argues that the understanding is
nothing but the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of
imagination (A 119).
I include these notes on Kant’s cognitive theory in order to
demonstrate how the meaning of his terminology undergoes constant
development and modification throughout the first part of the Critique.
No satisfactory interpretation of his theory of cognition can ignore these
modifications. 10 It is also worth noting, that, while he initially proceeds as
if it is possible to draw a sharp dividing line between sensibility and
understanding, a line also dividing the passive side of the mind from the
active side, the new threefold model seems to undermine this division.
5.5 The syntheses of imagination
At A 94, where Kant introduces his model of the three original faculties
of the mind, synthesis is associated with the imagination. At A 97 he
10
The fact that Kant often uses the same term in different senses is commented
on by a number of authors. Thus, for instance, Falkenstein (1995), 31 writes:
‘Kant was forced, by the internal dynamics of his project and the arguments
needed to establish his conclusions, to twist the traditional meanings of his terms.
Often, however, he is not aware that he has done so and he reverts to traditional
definitions, which continue to exist uneasily in his work alongside the revised
ones.’ Bennett (1966), 135 attacks Kant’s elusive use of terms as a weakness:
‘Worse, instead of choosing one label and keeping to it, Kant shifts restlessly from
one set of technical terms to another, making no attempt to relate them.’
Whether this is a weakness or not, I will not discuss here, however, Kant’s
inconstancy suggests that it is well worth paying attention to this terminology,
and also to search for the logic underlying the various ways in which terms are
used, if such a logic exist. As will soon become clear, I think it does.