BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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rule presupposes this person is first socialized into the practice directing
its application. 100
As far as I can see, there are striking parallels between Wittgenstein’s
theory of rules and practices as sketched here and Kant’s pragmatic
theory of embodied rationality. For instance, both theories explore
rationality at the level of what we have defined as embodied practice. In
the example above the focus was on mathematical calculation; however,
it is consistent with Wittgenstein’s perspective to generalize this point out
into a general theory of rationality. This means that conceptual
knowledge and conceptual skills should always, according to
Wittgenstein, be examined at the level of embodied practice. Also, both
theories tend to see rules as something inherent in embodied practices.
Not only does the correct application of a rule presuppose that the agent
is first socialized into the relevant practice of application, but the rule
itself exists in and through this practice.
The parallels between the two philosophers are perhaps most evident
if we re-examine Kant’s example of grammar. The rules of grammar, he
suggests, are present in the practice of a person speaking the language
corresponding to this grammar, even before they are abstracted from this
practice and formulated. From this we may infer that he sees rules as
existing in and through practices. Kant also promotes as a general
principle that practices are best learned by doing them, reminding us of
Wittgenstein’s theory that the proper employment of a rule presupposes
the larger context of a practice into which the agent is socialized.
It may be objected that comparing Kant and Wittgenstein in this way
may easily lead us to see more of Wittgenstein in Kant than the text may
justify. What may happen is that we project a Wittgensteinian
perspective back in time, creating a sort of optical illusion, making us
misinterpret the Kantian text. However, I do not think that the above
parallel is based on such a projection. What we are doing is simply
comparing two theoretical perspectives. I do not claim that they are
similar in all respects. I do think, however, that a certain familiarity with
Wittgenstein may help us recognize in Kant what might otherwise easily
be overlooked. Taking into account Wittgenstein’s reflections on the
relation between rules and practices, for instance, and seeing how,
through this, such reflections achieve the status of philosophy proper,
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Baker (1981), 55.
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIED PRACTICE