BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

248
KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Kant also argues that transcendental philosophy involves setting up a
certain kind of proof structure. Not any a priori insight [Erkenntnis] is
transcendental. Characteristic of a transcendental insight [Erkenntnis] is
that it makes us understand that and how certain representations
(intuitions or concepts) are possible and may be used a priori only.
And here I make a remark the import of which extends to all of the
following considerations, and that we must keep well in view, namely
that not every a priori cognition must be called transcendental, but
only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain
representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely a priori,
or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use a priori). (A
56/B 80)
In order to denote this transcendental proof structure, Kant introduces
the notion of a transcendental deduction. Most familiar is the
transcendental deductions of the categories. However, he also refers to
the proof structure of the Transcendental aesthetic as a transcendental
deduction (A 87/B 119-120). A transcendental deduction in general is
compared with a trial (A 84/B 116). 5 The aim of this trial is to explain
how it is possible for a concept to relate a priori to objects, and why this
use of the concept is justified. A transcendental deduction is contrasted
with an empirical deduction in which only the origin of the concept is
explained (A 85/B 117).
8.2 Problems
As Kant’s transcendental epistemology is part of his transcendental
philosophy, 6 what has been said so far also applies to this epistemology.
This raises a number of problems relative to what I have set out to prove
in this chapter, that the categories may be conceived of as embodied
practices. The claim, for instance, that only pure a priori representations
5
For a highly interesting study of the etymology of the term ‘deduction’ and the
meaning it had for Kant, cf. Dieter Henrich’s influential article (1989). According
to Henrich, the meaning of the term for Kant cannot be identified narrowly with
a logical deduction, represented by a syllogism, but was influenced by the
juridical Deduktionsschriften of his time which aim it was to justify controversial
legal claims, cf. Henrich (1989), 32.
6
The reason why I here distinguish between Kant’s transcendental philosophy in
general and transcendental epistemology in particular is that I take Kant’s notion
of transcendental philosophy to include more then just an epistemology. It
includes, e.g. also his transcendental psychology, i.e., cognitive theory.