BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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seems to be about to change. For instance Munzel argues, in terms
similar to those I have used concerning Kant’s anthropology, that Kant’s
pedagogical theory contains important philosophical insights, moreover,
it may also help us achieve a better understanding of other parts of his
philosophy, such as his ethics. 7
Before I say more about Kant’s pragmatic theory of embodied
rationality and how it developed, let me present some general remarks
concerning the terms ‘practice’, ‘embodied practice’ and ‘pragmatic’.
3.1 Practice
In contemporary philosophy the term ‘practice’ is central to the tradition
following the late Wittgenstein, who in his Philosophical investigations
ascribes a basic significance to human practices. 8 He argues that the
meaning of a term is defined by its use, and that this use is not arbitrary,
but directed by the language games in which it appears. A language
game, in turn, is typically seen as embedded in a more comprehensive,
practical enterprise. One of Wittgenstein’s well known examples is a
group of carpenters building a house. Their language game is in this case
embedded in their project of building the house. If we define ‘practice’ in
a preliminary way, as a set of acts serving to realize a goal, then building
a house may be characterized as a practice, and what Wittgenstein calls a
language game may be seen as a part or aspect of such a practice. The
notion of a game also implies the presence of rules, so a Wittgensteinian
practice may be seen as a set of acts taking place according to rules and
aiming at the realization of a goal.
This, I think, is also more or less the notion implied by Rawls when in
his Theory of justice he defines a practice as an activity taking place
according to rules.
I use the word ‘practice’ throughout as a sort of technical term
meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules [...] and
which gives the activity its structure. 9
MacIntyre also adheres to a conception close to the Wittgensteinian one,
defining ‘practice’ as:
7
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIED PRACTICE
For a further discussion of Kant’s On pedagogy and its reception, see Munzel
(1999), 258. Cf. also Pleines (1985), Hufnagel (1988) and Stark (2000).
8
Wittgenstein (1984).
9
John Rawls (1955), 3, footnote.