BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

48
THE EMBODIED MIND
Now I assert that all the difficulties one believes he [the dogmatic]
finds in these questions and with which, as dogmatic objections, one
seeks to give the appearance of having a deeper insight into the
nature of things than the common understanding can have, rest on a
mere semblance [Blendwerke], according to which one hypostatizes
what exists merely in thoughts, and — assuming it to be a real object
outside the thinking subject — takes the same quality, namely
extension, which is nothing but appearance, for a property of external
things subsisting even apart from our sensibility, and takes motion for
its effect, which really takes place in itself outside our senses. For
matter, whose community with the soul excites such great
reservations, is nothing other than a mere form, or a certain mode of
representation of an unknown object, through that intuition that one
calls outer sense. Thus there may very well be something outside us,
which we call matter, corresponding to this appearance; but in the
same quality as appearance it is not outside us, but is merely as a
thought in us, even though this thought, through the sense just
named, represents it as being found outside us. (A 384-385)
As we see, this argument leans heavily on the distinction between
appearances and things in themselves. In order to make this point as
clear as possible, the argument may be paraphrased as follows. When I
observe myself, I perceive nothing but appearances. Through my outer
sense, I appear to myself as a body, and as space is the form of outer
sense, this body is extended in space. Through my inner sense, I appear
to myself as a mind, and as time (only) is the form of inner sense, this
mind has no spatial extension. Now, as long as I stay on this level of
appearance, the community between my mind and my body is a mystery.
How can two phenomena that appear to be so different communicate?
However, reminding myself of the distinction between appearances and
things in themselves, and applying this distinction to the present case, I
realize that what I know as my body and mind are nothing but
appearances. They are appearances of an underlying and unknown
reality. And once we move to this level of reality, the above problem
dissolves. It does so, because on this level we have no reason to believe
that mind and body (or whatever corresponds to them at this level) are
different in the way they appear on the level of appearance.
By rephrasing Kant’s argument in this way, I do not mean to say that
Kant suggests that we should move to the level of things in themselves in
order to solve the traditional ontological mind-body problem there. That
would be quite contrary to the spirit of the Critique and its emphasis that
things in themselves lie beyond the reach of human knowledge. Kant’s
appeal to this deep level of reality in the above argument is merely
negative, reminding us that, as we know nothing about mind and body as