BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL SCHEMATISM 185
term ‘imagination’ and how it is used within Kant’s theory of
schematism. I think it is absolutely necessary to do this if we are to arrive
at a proper understanding of Kant’s schematism theory.
6.4 Rossvær’s anti-mentalist approach
A key point made by Rossvær is that some Kantian terms that at first
sight appear to refer exclusively to an inner domain in fact do not do so
after all. Rossvær gives special attention to the terms ‘intuition’ and
‘imagination’. Central to his discussion of the term ‘intuition’ are some
remarks on mathematics made by Kant in the Transcendental doctrine
of method (A 729-30/B757-8). Kant here discusses what he calls ‘the
construction of mathematical concepts in the intuition’. What kind of
construction is this, Rossvær asks? One possible answer is that Kant is
referring to constructions taking place in an inner mental space, or some
abstract or ideal mathematical space other than the space we inhabit as
embodied beings. 22
Rossvær argues, however, that this interpretation is
far from obvious. On the contrary, Kant presents a number of examples
suggesting that the constructions in question are ordinary, external
constructions taking place, for instance, by constructing geometrical
figures on a piece of paper. If this is the case, then ‘intuition’ cannot be
given a merely mental interpretation.
Rossvær also discusses Kant’s claim that the apodictic nature of a
geometrical proof is derived from the fact that such a proof is led by the
intuition. Again he asks whether ‘intuition’ is here to be understood in a
mental sense. At least one example, he argues, suggest that it should not.
In a passage at A 716-17/B744-45. Kant discusses the Euclidean proof
that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. For a
philosopher limited to conceptual analysis this is impossible to prove, he
argues. For the geometer, however, the case is different. He simply
constructs a triangle and then he proceeds by a series of constructive
steps to prove his point. Kant gives a detailed account of these steps, and
there is no doubt, Rossvær argues, that he is referring to overt
constructions performed by an embodied agent. If this is what Kant
means by a proof led by intuition [von der Anschauung geleitet], then
‘intuition’ cannot be understood in a mental sense. Rather it seems to
refer simply to the act of seeing what is immediately present before one’s
22
See Rossvær (1974), 92 for a further discussion of this view.