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BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

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SPATIAL EXPERIENCE <strong>AND</strong> THE <strong>BODY</strong> <strong>IN</strong> THE CRITIQUE 165<br />

elaborates further on his theory of the syntheses of the imagination. Here<br />

the notion of a threefold synthesis is introduced:<br />

If therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a<br />

manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this,<br />

and receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with<br />

spontaneity. This is now the ground of a threefold synthesis, which is<br />

necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension<br />

of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the<br />

reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their recognition in<br />

the concept. Now these direct us toward three subjective sources of<br />

cognition, which make possible even the understanding and, through<br />

the latter, all experience as an empirical product of understanding. (A<br />

97) 11<br />

This passage is loaded with information. The threefold synthesis, we are<br />

told, is a necessary condition of all cognition. What does this mean? I will<br />

try to answer this question, with the emphasis still on the A-edition of the<br />

text.<br />

5.6 Apprehension<br />

Apprehension is the first of the three syntheses mentioned at A 97. At A<br />

99 it is defined as a process creating a unity of the manifold of intuition.<br />

In order to do this, we have to go through and put together this<br />

manifold, Kant explains, and this is apprehension.<br />

Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as,<br />

say, in the representation of space) it is necessary first to run through<br />

and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the<br />

synthesis of apprehension. (A 99)<br />

Kant’s way of describing apprehension is interesting, not only in that it<br />

exemplifies how important the activity of the mind is in cognition. It also<br />

expands the theory of the a priori forms of intuition that was presented in<br />

the Transcendental aesthetic. There the a priori forms of intuition were<br />

described as a priori and ascribed to the mind with only vague references<br />

to activity. Now time and space are clearly associated with activity and at<br />

11<br />

In this passage Kant also uses the term ‘synopsis’. This is one of the more<br />

obscure notions of the Critique. It is mentioned explicitly only twice in the whole<br />

Critique and only in the first edition, and I will not discuss it here. For a brief<br />

discussion of the term, cf. e.g. Brook (1994), 125.

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