BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

111
Thus, the idea of an understanding proceeding without consciousness is
not in conflict with Kant’s general ideas of the mind as put forward
before or after the Critique. 81
3.11 Judgments cannot be learned
Now, let us return to Kant’s pragmatic theory of embodied rationality.
So far this theory of rationality has been discussed primarily in
connection with his theory of the understanding, but he also discusses
practice in relation to another higher cognitive faculty, that is, the power
of judgment [Urteilskraft]. Let us take a look at some of these passages in
which this is done and try to find out whether these passages add
something new to Kant’s pragmatic theory of embodied rationality, or
whether they only express the theory in a somewhat different form.
Let us start our examination with a passage from the Anthropology.
Instruction can enrich natural understanding [Der natürliche
Verstand] with many concepts and equip it with rules. But the second
intellectual power, judgment (judicium) – the power of deciding
whether or not something is an instance of the rule – cannot be
instructed; it can only be exercised [geübt]. This is why we speak of a
growth in judgment as maturity, and call judgment the kind of
understanding that comes only with years. 82
Kant opens this passage by arguing that what he calls the natural
understanding may be enriched by a multitude of concepts and rules.
However, where the second intellectual capacity is concerned, the power
of judgment, the task of which it is to decide whether something is an
instance of a concept or not, this cannot be taught but can only be
developed through practice. This is why we refer to its development as a
process of maturation, and why this maturation is not normally found in
people below a certain age.
He then proceeds to explain why proper judgments cannot be taught,
but only learned through practice.
81 We shall see later that Kant promotes similar ideas in the Critique.
82 Ak VII: 199.
RATIONALITY AND EMBODIED PRACTICE