BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

1.12 A new perspective on the body-mind problem
Now, let us look at how the transcendental perspective suggested by the
Inaugural dissertation opens up a radically new way of discussing and
evaluating the traditional ontological mind-body problem. Kant himself
makes this point when eleven years later he discusses the problem in the
Critique. Let us briefly examine his argument, found in the paralogism
chapter of the A-edition of the Critique.
The argument rests heavily on the distinction between appearances
and things in themselves. From the fact that physical objects appear to us
as extended, he argues, we cannot infer that they are also extended in
themselves. On the contrary, extension is nothing but the form of outer
sense. This insight, he now argues, may be used to show that the old
problem of the community of mind and body [der Möglichkeit der
Gemeinschaft der Seele mit einem organischen Körper] is built on
nothing but a fantasy. 94
THE EMBODIED MIND
47
This fantasy, which according to Kant has
haunted rational psychology for far too long, involves the idea that
extension pertains to objects as they exist independently of our sensibility.
At the same time, rational psychology defines the mind as an immaterial
substance without extension. So conceived it is impossible to explain how
mind and body can communicate.
We may escape this dilemma, Kant continues, once we make clear to
ourselves that what we perceive as extension in material objects,
including our own bodies, is nothing but the form of outer sense. How
does this help us to solve the ontological mind-body problem? His point,
as I understand it, is not that this insight solves the problem in itself, but
it sets us free from the problem by making us see that there is no need to
solve it. There is no need to explain how extended, material objects,
including our own bodies, can affect and communicate with immaterial
minds, because, whatever those objects or bodies are, we have no reason
to believe that they, considered in themselves, are extended, material
objects. 95 Here is a summary of his argument:
of which we become aware as they take place, pass into Leibniz’ doctrine of
cognitive forms. As for Kant’s cognitive theory, we have seen that parts of its
terminology were already present in Maladies of the mind from 1764. This
terminology also belongs to a longstanding tradition in philosophy.
94
A 384.
95
Whether Kant’s point is that the things in themselves have no temporal or
spatial determinations, or whether his point is more modest, that our knowledge
of the ultimate nature of the objects of our world is limited, has been much
discussed. I will say more about this in chapter 7.