BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE BODY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL 241
embodied mind. We have also seen that there are cases in which the
Kantian notion of a representation may be seen as referring to selfconscious,
embodied movement, such as in his transcendental theory of
space. If we accept that transcendentally considered, space is selfconscious
embodied movement, and also, transcendentally considered,
that space is a representation, then the point just made follows. 24
However, I do not want to restrict the meaning of the Kantian term
‘representation’ to those suggested by these examples. I think
‘representation’ as used by Kant may have several meanings, each
depending on the perspective that is operative. Sometimes, for instance,
he seems to use it in the sense of mental image. However, my point is
that where the representations of sensibility are concerned, the
underlying message of the Critique is that these are always grounded in
our immediate awareness of our embodied states in the way specified
above. Even my visual representation of, for instance, a tree is so
grounded. What is the exact connection between the awareness of my
embodied states and this visual representation? As Kant does not supply
us with an explicit answer to this question, it is hard to say what his
answer might have been. The basic point that I take to be implied by the
Critique is that such a connection exists, and that we need to be
reminded of this. More than in any other kind of perception, there is a
quality to visual perception that makes objects appear to us as something
existing in themselves independently of whether we perceive them or not
and with qualities that stand in no relation to our way of perceiving
them. I think that a basic message of Kant’s transcendental philosophy is
that even my visual perception of a tree, or some other distant object, is
grounded in immediate embodied experiences, such as my awareness of
the light reflected from the object affecting my eyes, and my awareness of
my embodied acts as I move my pupils in order to get the object in focus,
or when I move in order to see the object from different angles.
I asked what the exact connection was between my awareness of my
embodied states and my visual representation of, for instance, a tree and
I claimed that Kant does not supply us with an explicit theory of this
connection. This does not mean that Kant has nothing more to say on
the matter other than what has been suggested so far. When I have
referred to the immediate awareness of embodied states, i.e., the states on
which my empirical representations are grounded, I have given an
24 The same point may be deduced from his theory of schematism, according to
which a schema is an embodied practice, and at the same time, also claimed to
be a representation.