BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

212
SPATIAL SCHEMATISM
Critique, and nowhere more than in the schematism chapter. If this
chapter gives the key to a proper understanding of other parts of the
Critique, however, then the same point applies to all of the Critique. In
the next chapter I will discuss how this may further enhance our
understanding of the text.
6.15 Summary
In this chapter I have discussed Kant’s theory of schematism as it is
found in the Critique. As I read it, the task of Kant’s theory of
schematism is to establish how our concepts apply to the world of objects
intuited in time and space. And even if Kant himself is not always explicit
on this point, I maintain that it is possible to distinguish two parts within
this project, one having to do with temporal schematism (time) and one
with spatial schematism (space). In this chapter I have only discussed
Kant’s theory of spatial schematism. The basic idea of this theory,
according to my interpretation, is that in order to subsume a spatially
extended object under its concept, we have, by means of our body or
parts of our body, to copy or recreate its shape in an act similar to
drawing. More specifically, such an embodied practice is what Kant calls
a schema. Using a triangle as an example, Kant’s basic idea is that the
recognition of a triangle as a triangle takes place by making a movement
similar to the one involved in the construction of a triangle, and, in
making this movement, to recognize it as the movement involved in such
a construction.
I have also discussed how the Kantian term ‘imagination’ is to be
understood. I have argued that in the context of Kantian philosophy the
term refers to the human capacity for image production in general. This
means that the imagination is active whenever a person uses her body to
create images or image-like structures, whether this results in a material
image, or not.