BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

SPATIAL SCHEMATISM 179
theory of schematism Kant answers this question by establishing a theory
of embodied practice. In order to subsume a spatially extended object
under its concept, we have, by means of our body or part of our body, to
copy or recreate its shape in an act similar to drawing. More specifically,
such an embodied practice is what he calls a schema. A possible
objection to this idea is that even if he admits that the notion of a schema
refers to a kind of activity [Verfahren], this activity, according to Kant,
takes place in the imagination. This seems to exclude the possibility that
the notion of a schema can be interpreted as referring to embodied
practices. However, this depends on how the term ‘imagination’ is
understood. I will argue that in the context of Kantian philosophy, the
term refers to the human capacity for image production in general. This
means that the imagination is active also when a person uses her body to
create images or image-like structures.
Several authors have suggested that Kant’s theory of schematism is a
key to understanding his theory of space as it is found, for instance, in the
Transcendental aesthetic. 4 In a previous chapter I argued that Kant’s
critical theory of space repeats on an abstract level the basic structure of
the theory found in texts like Directions in space, Orientation,
Anthropology and On pedagogy. That is, our experience of spatially
extended objects presupposes that we perform certain embodied acts, as
when we grasp and feel an object with our hands. Kant’s theory of spatial
schematism in part addresses the same topic, i.e. spatial experience, and
so in a certain sense the present chapter continues the argument of the
previous one. Thus, I will argue that if we establish that Kant’s theory of
spatial schematism needs to be interpreted as a theory of an embodied
self performing certain embodied practices, then his critical theory of
space in general should be interpreted along the same lines.
Kant himself said that the chapter on schematism was one of the
most important chapters in the Critique. 5 Not everyone agrees with him
on this point and T. E. Wilkerson goes as far as to suggest that it serves
no useful purpose at all and can be ignored without loss. 6 At the other
end of the scale we find Heidegger claiming that it is the real heart of the
Critique. 7
A positive evaluation of Kant’s theory of schematism has also
4
Cf. e.g. Schaper (1992), 312 and Rossvær (1974), 100.
5
Cf. Prolegomena, § 34.
6
Wilkerson (1976), 94.
7
Heidegger (1976), 358.