BODY AND PRACTICE IN KANT

THE RELATIONAL CATEGORIES 281
possibility of such a time. Our appearances would then relate to two
separate times flowing side by side. But this is clearly beyond reason (A
188-189/B 231-232). Even if it is perhaps not crystal clear what this
argument achieves, it confirms what seems to be Kant’s basic point in the
first analogy. A representation of a single and unified time is possible only
under the condition that we think of the appearances of nature as being
founded on something the quantity of which is neither increasing or
decreasing.
10.2 The second analogy
Looking at what Kant is trying to achieve with the three analogies, the
first one has laid down some foundations, but he has not yet told us how
it is possible to have knowledge of the objective order of time. This
question is dealt with in the second analogy. This presents what he refers
to as ‘the principle of temporal succession according to the law of
causality’. In the B-edition, the principle is expressed in this way:
All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of
cause and effect. (B 232)
The proof following this principle states that only if experience is
organized according to the principle of cause and effect can we
determine the objective time order of two events. This is possible, Kant
argues, for the reason that when we have determined an event A to be
the cause of another event B, then, as part of this determination, we have
also determined that B follows A. Thus, we have also established an
objective time relation between A and B (A 192/B 237).
To illustrate this proof Kant presents his famous example of the
house and the ship. Imagine, first, that you are observing a house.
According to his theory of apprehension, you have to take it into your
consciousness part by part. Now, it is clear that the order in which the
different parts of the house are apprehended is not determined by any
rule. This means that the parts may be apprehended in a number of
different ways. In this sense, the order of apprehension is accidental.
Imagine now that you see a ship drifting down a river. At one moment
you see the ship at one point in the river and some time later you observe
it at a lower point in the river. In this case, Kant argues, you cannot first
apprehend the ship at the lower point and then, at some later time,
apprehend it at the higher position. The order of the succession of
perceptions is here determined by something transcending the subjective
order of apprehension.